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JAZZ IMPROVISATION AND THE LAW:
CONSTRAINED CHOICE, SEQUENCE, AND
STRATEGIC MOVEMENT WITHIN RULES
William W. Buzbee*
This Article argues that a richer understanding of the nature of law is
possible through comparative, analogical examination of legal work and
the art of jazz improvisation. This exploration illuminates a middle ground
between rule of law aspirations emphasizing stability and determinate
meanings and contrasting claims that the untenable alternative is pervasive
discretionary or politicized law. In both the law and jazz improvisation settings, the work involves constraining rules, others’ unpredictable actions,
and strategic choosing with attention to where a collective creation is going. One expects change and creativity in improvisation, but the many analogous characteristics of law illuminate why change and choice are the
norm in law too. Rarely is law just about ferreting out some isolated, clear,
but abstruse legal command. In jazz and legal settings, relative assessments
of strength are more commonly apt than are expectations of a single correct
answer or simple binary right-versus-wrong determinations. There is a
world of difference between claims that law simply provides determinate
answers, versus claims that law constrains and guides what remain choices.
Much as jazz improvisers must be highly sensitive to the surrounding constrained choices of others, legal analysis of context and consequences of
legal choices, with substantial attention to others’ roles and competence,
should always be part of legal actions. This different way of thinking about
law’s nature helps illuminate and critique both major methodological legal
divides, enduring jurisprudential debates, and several cutting-edge case
studies. Those case studies include standing law’s transformation, including the 2021 TransUnion standing decision, ongoing battles over what
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waters are protected by the Clean Water Act, debates over textualist methodology’s claims of constraint, and increasing judicial reliance on the “major questions doctrine” with shifts away from the familiar deferential Chevron framework. Improvising musicians must ensure their choices musically
fit with governing forms, practices, and others’ choices. Similarly, the Article closes by illuminating why, to further rule of law values and check
power abuses, legal actors should always assess the consequential congruence of their tenable choices with surrounding law, giving substantial
weight to statutory policies and linked effects analysis by agencies.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article argues that a richer understanding of the nature of law is possible through comparative, analogical examination of legal work and the art of
jazz improvisation. This exploration of jazz and law and their modal and structural similarities illuminates a middle ground between rule of law aspirations
emphasizing stability and determinate meanings and contrasting claims that the
untenable alternative is pervasive discretionary or politicized law. Improvising
musicians must always make choices in light of constraining rules, others’ uncoordinated choices, and with attention to where their collective creation is going.
Similarly, the work of law typically involves legal choosing from a range of tenable options, also in sequentially developing settings involving multiple constrained but unpredictable players. Rarely is law actually just about reading or
ferreting out some isolated, clear, but abstruse legal command. As a result, this
Article argues, much as jazz improvisers must be highly sensitive to the surrounding constrained choices of others, legal analysis of context and consequences of legal choices, with substantial attention to others’ roles and competence, should always be part of legal actions. This different way of thinking about
law’s nature helps illuminate and critique both major methodological legal divides and several cutting-edge case studies, among them the 2021 TransUnion
standing decision, battles over what waters are protected by the Clean Water Act,
debates over textualist methodology’s claims of constraint, and increasing judicial reliance on the “major questions doctrine” with shifts away from the familiar
deferential Chevron framework.
In this analogical exploration, I compare the nature of law and legal work
not to final recorded performances of music, but to the internal practices of musicians doing improvisation, especially in the small ensemble bebop setting.1 The
rigor and challenging practices and constraints of jazz improvisation have been
mischaracterized or glossed over in most previous United States legal scholarship.2 Like the work of legal actors generating legal materials such as briefs,
court decisions, statutes, regulations, and regulatory guidance and advocacy, jazz
improvisation involves substantial freedom of choice, yet it is subject to a

1. For analogous examinations of the practices of jazz improvisation, see generally PAUL F. BERLINER,
THINKING IN JAZZ: THE INFINITE ART OF IMPROVISATION (1994) (comprehensively analyzing jazz improvisation); Kwami Tain Coleman, The “Second Quintet: Miles Davis, the Jazz Avant-Garde, and Change, 1959–68
(Aug. 2014) (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (analyzing the Miles Davis Second Quintet’s changing
methods); BARRY KERNFELD, WHAT TO LISTEN FOR IN JAZZ (1995) (explaining jazz elements); see also INGRID
D. MONSON, SAYING SOMETHING; JAZZ IMPROVISATION AND INTERACTION 3–4 (1996) (discussing improvisatory
practices from “insider perspectives” with focus on the rhythm section).
2. See infra Part II.
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complex array of constraints, rules, and traditions.3 Both law and improvisatory
jazz tend, through their application of constraining materials and linked choosing, to go somewhere. Neither is just about what is. In jazz and legal settings,
relative assessments of strength are more commonly apt than are expectations of
a single correct answer or simple binary right-versus-wrong determinations.4
One expects change and creativity in improvisation, but the many analogous
characteristics of law illuminate why change and choice are the norm in law too.5
Choice, however, does not mean unfettered discretion. Law seldom provides determinate answers, but if wielded with integrity, it constrains legal actors’ choosing.6
Concededly, this Article’s basic claims may run counter to claims of textualists, rule of law advocates, and jurisprudential scholars, who insist law must be
stable and knowable.7 Fury is often directed at judges or regulators who concede
the discretionary and policy-laden elements of their legal work.8 The correlative
concepts of administrative agency discretion and judicial deference, which share
modal attributes with jazz improvisation, are under attack as constitutionally suspect.9 A judge who describes his role as just calling “balls and strikes,” as declared Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts when a Supreme Court nominee, is often lauded for appropriate restraint and virtue.10
Other skeptical readers may arrive at this point with a predisposition that
jazz improvisation is simply too different to illuminate law. They may erroneously conceive of jazz improvisation as something wild, emotional, unconstrained, or ephemeral, almost the antithesis of common perceptions of law as
fundamentally about reducing disorder.11 In reality, structured and constrained

3. See infra Section III.C.
4. See infra Sections III.D, IV.C.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See Richard H. Fallon, The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implication for Theories of Legal
Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1265, 1306–08 (2015) (exploring types of legal “meaning” and favoring
“legally constrained normative judgments,” and “interpretive eclecticism” over rigid ex ante commitment to
methods). See infra Part V for exploration of consequential congruence analysis.
7. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1146–47, 1150–53 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch,
J.) (claiming agencies can shift policies based on a “policy whim” due to deference regimes in the majority and
concurring opinions).
8. See generally Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer & Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2018) (reviewing the literature on deference doctrines).
9. See Walker, supra note 8 (citing opinion making such arguments); infra Subsection IV.D.4 (presenting
deference regime shifts).
10. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts to be Chief Justice of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts,
Supreme Court nominee). For critical analysis, see David S. Louk, The Audiences of Statutes, 105 CORNELL L.
REV. 137, 149–50 (2020) (citing Charles Fried, Balls and Strikes, 61 EMORY L.J. 641 (2012)). See generally
Ronald A. Cass, The Umpire Strikes Back: Expanding Judicial Discretion for Review of Administrative Actions,
73 ADMIN. L. REV. 553 (2021) (analyzing judicial review of agency discretion and Roberts’ views).
11. Cf. BERLINER, supra note 1, at 492–93. Even the most “out” or “free” modes of improvisation involve
constraining norms; see Coleman, supra note 1, at 88 (discussing “time, no changes” form); see also Shelby
Pope, Ishmael Wadada Leo Smith Explains His Colorful, Abstract Musical Notation, KQED ARTS (Dec. 8, 2016),
https://www.kqed.org/arts/12428335/ishmael-wadada-leo-smith-explains-his-colorful-abstract-musical-notation
[https://perma.cc/7H8K-3M6B] (describing Smith’s abstract notations guiding his music).
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choices in settings akin to conversation with shared goals are central to jazz improvisation, with masterful creativity working within those constraints the apex
accomplishment of a jazz improviser. Law and jazz improvisation both involve
challenging, intellectual tasks. As master guitarist Julian Lage recently stated,
“thinking . . . gets a bad rap with improvisation.”12
Despite the powerful influence of constraining texts and practices in both
settings, this Article shows that both are characterized by ex ante unpredictability
and pervasive change over time.13 A single determinate or predictable outcome
is rare, although choices will be made and outcomes reached.14 In the realm of
law, settlement, at least for a time, is possible.15 Abundant scholarship often tries
to identify the essence of law, pointing to the power of the state, or of legitimated
coercive force, or law as a protective force, or the centrality of command.16 This
Article focuses less on law’s effects at particular moments than on how and why
legal actors tend to work with and generate legal materials in settings where no
single advance correct predictive answer could exist. Doing law changes and
clarifies the law, making the line between “doing law” and “the law” forever
blurred.
Neither legal work nor jazz improvisation is merely about replicating an
earlier creation or discovering some single static thing. In Justice Cardozo’s
words, law does not involve simply “match[ing] the colors of the case at hand
against the colors of many sample cases,” or vast memory banks.17 “[S]erious”
legal work is of “intellectual interest” because it does not involve a mere matching exercise akin to having the best “card index of the cases.”18 Similarly, choosing and change are central to jazz improvisation.19 As stated by bassist Buster
Williams, “[i]f it was all thought out before it was done, there would be no need
to do it.”20
The focus hence is not on a particular frozen moment in the law or appraisal
of a recorded jazz solo, but on understanding the doing of each and the implications of their analogous institutional relationships, modalities, sequentially
12. Levine School of Music, Master Class with Julian Lage, at 45:48 (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.levinemusic.org/performance/guitar-master-class-julian-lage/ [https://perma.cc/78VA-M6PP]. He also described
improvisation as involving “flexible architecture,” “conversation with topics,” and “listening with a question.”
Id.
13. See generally John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing and
Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129 (1992) (exploring critical race
theory through a focus on Archie Shepp’s music).
14. See infra Sections III.D, IV.C.
15. See generally LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001) (discussing constitutional law settlement with emphasis on
how it often unsettles other legal and political venues).
16. For rejection of the “command” theory of law and call for attention to the “forces” shaping law and
consequences, see Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809, 836–37, 843–44 (1935) (disputing that law involves “logical deduction from fixed principles”).
17. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20–21 (1921) (criticizing such a view
in the common law setting).
18. Id.
19. BERLINER, supra note 1, at 268 (quoting Williams); see infra Section III.C.
20. BERLINER, supra note 1, at 268 (quoting Williams).
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unfolding settings, and thought patterns dealing with freedom and choice within
constraints.
To illuminate these similar skills and modalities, the Article starts in Part II
by reviewing briefly past works linking law and music, distinguishing this Article’s project from past scholarship. It then turns in Part III to exploration of fundamentals of jazz improvisation and its development over time, drawing primarily on musicians’ explanations.
In Part IV, the Article then turns to the mechanisms of legal change and
inevitability of legal choice and discretion. After exploring how and when people
choose to do legal work, it offers several case studies involving the major institutional modes of law in its codified public law forms—constitutional law, statutory interpretation, and administrative law. The Article presents settings where
legal actors claim obedience to determinate commands, yet close analysis actually shows choosing and change much like the practices of jazz improvisation.
The case studies include tracing of changes in standing doctrine, with a special
focus on the legal leaps and questions raised by the recent 2021 TransUnion decision.21 It then turns to several decades of battle over unchanged statutory language defining what is a protected “water of the United States.” This issue, in
2022, again went before the Supreme Court.22 The Article then engages with the
ongoing statutory interpretation debate over textualist method and the dynamism
or constraint resulting from reference to few or many sources, or what has been
called the “source proliferation” question.23 This Part closes with enduring but
contested deference frames applicable to judicial review of administrative
agency action, focusing on the shifting nature of the new “major questions doctrine.”24
Part V closes by arguing that conceptions of—and aspirations for—fit, congruence and integrity are more appropriate frames for thinking about the reality
of principled law than are characterizations of all law as either rudderless or just
a world of difficult “balls and strikes.” Much as the best musical improvisation
engages with its many resources and constraints, legal actions are likely to show
integrity when they grapple honestly with the linked preceding legal materials,
methodological norms, institutional competence, and effects and science complexities, with paramount weight usually given to political branch policymaking
and well-grounded empirical assessments.
But the Article closes with an additional, crucial point. Legal actors should
assess their tenable choices’ consequences and how they mesh or clash with other
sources of legal authority, especially governing statutes. This is not a call for
“purposive” modes of statutory interpretation or broad forays into other statutes’
language choices in a claimed effort to make sense of the statutory “corpus
21. See generally TransUnion L.L.C. v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021).
22. See infra notes 410–14 (discussing unexpected 2021 Supreme Court grant of the petition in Sackett v.
EPA).
23. See generally Adam M. Samaha, Looking Over a Crowd: Do More Sources Mean More Discretion?,
92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554 (2017).
24. See infra Subsection IV.D.4.
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juris.”25 Much as jazz improvisers must mesh with surrounding choices of others,
legal actors should assess the consequences of their own choices (in advocacy or
decisions) and their congruence with preceding or underlying legal materials.
With such transparent reasoning, resulting law will be clearer and more prospectively constraining, plus disruptive acontextual outcomes will be less likely.26
II. LAW AND MUSIC REVISITED
That law and music share attributes and thought modalities is not a new
observation. Nor is legal scholars’ use of musical metaphors or analogies to illuminate the nature of law. For example, recent legal works reference hip-hop, although focused less on the structures of the music than on culture clashes, inclusion and exclusion, and race and the law.27 This Article’s project is different. It
focuses more internally on the practices and structures of law and jazz improvisation and, through this comparative exploration, seeks to illuminate how strategic change, choice, interaction, and resulting systemic dynamism can be reconciled with systems laden with constraining rules. To set the stage for this
Article’s distinctive claim that the doing of law and jazz improvisation share
many common modal elements, this Part briefly reviews past explorations of law,
music, and the arts to sharpen this Article’s different claim.
Among the most elegant explorations of music and the law is in an essay
by Professors Sanford Levinson and J.M. (Jack) Balkin, “Law, Music, and Other
Performing Arts.”28 Their article looks broadly at music and performance, with
a focus on “interpretation” and the choices inherent in interpreting even a written
text, be it law or classical music.29 In its most in-depth exploration, the authors
assess the implications of performances using period instruments versus contemporary instruments and link that analysis to legal debates over methods to interpret legal texts, especially constitutions.30
Levinson and Balkin give jazz and improvisation passing mention, mainly
dismissing its relevance to understanding law. They “exempt[] jazz from the discussion due to its deliberately improvisatory form . . . .”31 Later, they characterize
jazz improvisation as involving “unself-consciously living within it”; the “it” appears to allude to something like living “in the moment”.32 They only “half in
25. See generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, Cracking the Whole Code Rule, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76 (2021)
(analyzing the Roberts Court’s “whole code” application); see infra Subsection IV.D.3.
26. See generally Kevin M. Stack, Preambles as Guidance, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1252 (2016) (exploring agency preambles as a form of guidance).
27. See generally HIP HOP AND THE LAW (Pamela Bridgewater, andré douglas pond cummings, & Donald
F. Tibbs eds., 2015) (focusing on how hip hop music engages and raises issues of race, the criminal justice
system, and copyright); Paul Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV.
983 (2004) (using hip hop music to inform theories of punishment).
28. See generally Sanford Levinson & J. M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. PA.
L. REV. 1597 (1991).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1598–1602.
31. Id. at 1623.
32. Id. at 1637–38.
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jest” question if the “performance of constitutional interpretation” is more like a
classical music performance or “jazz improvisation on Thelonious Monk’s
Round Midnight.”33 As explored below, these passing characterizations of the
nature of jazz improvisation are rooted in several errors.34
The nature of federalism has also been illuminated through musical analogy. Although the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence often emphasizes
the benefits of distinctive and separate federal and state roles, the dominant political choice for over a century has been to harness concurrent, overlapping, and
often intertwined federal and state roles.35 Sometimes the metaphor of “marble
cake” has been suggested as a visual way, or perhaps baking metaphor, to understand federalism.36 A wave of modern federalism scholarship questions the recurrent judicial doctrinal preference for separation, criticizes prevalent federalism metaphors, and highlights the benefits of concurrency and interaction
facilitated through diverse federalism choices.37
Dean Robert Schapiro offers a musical metaphor, arguing that the dominant
political federalism choice of overlap and interaction is like polyphonic music,
where voices can weave around each other and sometimes harmonize, collectively creating a richer whole.38 This evocative classical music metaphor for federalism does not, however, engage much with this Article’s focus on how sequence, choice, and creativity within constraint are pervasive elements of the
doing of law. Federalism similarly can be efficacious, especially when leaving
room for tailoring, experimentation, and learning benefits over time.39 These attributes are much like jazz improvisation, but that metaphor has not been
33. Id. at 1654 (also citing John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a
World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 837 n.10 (1991), for his dismissal
of jazz improvisation as illuminating).
34. Monson notes that some jazz improvisation critics “have no real musical knowledge.” MONSON, supra
note 1, at 6.
35. See generally William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007) (exploring federalism regulatory concurrence and implications of
regulatory floors and ceilings) [hereinafter Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation]; William W. Buzbee, Federalism
Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge, 2017 WISC. L. REV. 1037 (exploring climate policy benefits
of federalism-facilitated cross-jurisdictional and cross-institutional learning) [hereinafter Buzbee, Federalism
Hedging].
36. This metaphor is generally attributed to Morton Grodzins, The Federal System, in GOALS FOR
AMERICANS 74, 74–78 (1960).
37. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 879–98 (2006); Jessica
Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1259 (2009); Ann E.
Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2009); Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and
Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 541–43 (2011); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57
DUKE L.J. 2023, 2026–29 (2008). See generally Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, supra note 35; Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 35; William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENV’T.
L.J. 108 (2005); Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and
Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933 (2008); Sarah E. Light, Precautionary Federalism
and the Sharing Economy, 66 EMORY L.J. 333 (2017).
38. See ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS 7–9, 37–91, 94–97 (2009) (exploring revival of some dual federalism elements and introducing polyphonic music as an “aural” federalism metaphor).
39. See id.
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suggested by this author or others in the proliferation of recent work about federalism interaction’s benefits.40
While not directly exploring music and the law, several giants of jurisprudence explore creative collective efforts and how they develop like law. For example, Ronald Dworkin’s “chain novel” metaphor explains how even judges acting in good faith to hew to the law necessarily interpret it then pass along its next
chapter to lawyers and future law interpreters.41 Like a chain novel written sequentially by different authors, change is the inevitable result, even if each judge
seeks the best answer.42 In contrast to this Article, however, Dworkin resisted a
“hybrid” concept of law that acknowledged how legal actors both interpret legal
materials and create new law, with “discarding” of some materials along the
way.43 Despite Dworkin’s “single best answer” insistence, he did, at times, grapple with the many actors and institutions that shape the law’s development.44 Lon
Fuller developed a similar theme, likening law to how jokes are heard, then retold
with inevitable changes in the retelling.45
Judges, writers, and professors from the late nineteenth and early to midtwentieth century—especially Oliver Wendell Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo,
Learned Hand, and Jerome Frank—drew on musical metaphors to describe the
work of lawyers, although mostly focused on what judges do in systems governed by common law.46 All emphasized the frequent absence of clear answers
or dispositive precedent and the resulting need for judicial pragmatic understanding and choosing.47 None argued that this sort of reasoning is unprincipled; all
viewed law as constraining.48 Some of this work alludes to finding the “melody”
in the law to derive conclusions.49 Much of this work preceded the emergence of
jazz, and certainly bebop improvisation, but their exploration of common law’s
context-rich choosing reveals attributes much like jazz improvisation.

40.
41.

Id.
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 229 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE]; RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 279–80 (1978) (acknowledging questions about the “best answer” claim,
and “insist[ing]” judicial task is still “discovering,” not “inventing”); id. at 294–330 (identifying settings possibly
lacking a single best answer); Joseph Raz, Dworkin: A New Link in the Chain, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1103, 1115–19
(1986) (book review) (discussing a book of essays by Dworkin and theories of “the best”).
42. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 41, at 225–75; Raz, supra note 41, at 1116.
43. See Raz, supra note 41, at 1113–19 (discussing Dworkin’s “best answer” writings and concluding “we
have the same hybrid theory we had all along”).
44. See id. at 1116–18 (discussing how later Dworkin “whittled down” best answer claim).
45. LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 8 (1940). For cogent linking of Dworkin’s and Fuller’s
metaphors, see David Luban, Rediscovering Fuller’s Legal Ethics, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 801, 804–05 (1998).
46. See Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
1259, 1260–62 (1947) (discussing music metaphors and “interpretation” as a “middle ground” between “disregarding the composer’s intention and being intelligently imaginative”).
47. For excerpts of their views and dynamics of common law change, see EVA H. HANKS, MICHAEL E.
HERZ & STEVEN S. NEMERSON, ELEMENTS OF LAW 34–51 (1994).
48. Fallon similarly observes how common law involves pragmatic change and constraining traditions.
See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1304.
49. Learned Hand, The Speech of Justice, 29 HARV. L. REV. 617, 620 (1916) (discussed in Frank, supra
note 46, at 1263–64).
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Jerome Frank went beyond common-law analysis, exploring the interpretation of statutes and agency roles through a musical analogy.50 Frank criticized
the aim of “abject literalism” and efforts to remove “the human element” in interpreting legal texts, especially statutes.51 He approvingly quoted Hand’s call
for judges and agencies to interpret statutes with “sympathetic and imaginative
discovery.”52 He viewed the legislature as like a “composer,” who must “leave
interpretation to others.”53
A few legal scholars have, to varying degrees and with different scholarly
goals, drawn on jazz improvisation to illuminate different facets of law, language, race, or justice. Sara Ramshaw, a Canadian law professor, in Justice as
Improvisation, provides a notably erudite examination of the nature of improvisation and uses it to illuminate a case study of the evolution of New York City
cabaret laws and regulation of jazz musicians.54 Her excellent book also provides
a vehicle for an extended engagement with the writings of Jacques Derrida.55 In
United States legal scholarship, John Calmore’s discussion of jazz and law focuses on the more “out” or “fire music” forms of jazz played by Archie Shepp,
through the analogy exploring the nature of critical legal studies, race theory, and
the effects of race and racism in shaping American music and law.56 Sheila Simon’s exploration of jazz and family law tracks the changing forms of jazz, emphasizing the improviser’s freedom and parallels in outsiders’ influence.57 Susan
Silbey and Patricia Ewick explore the nature of law and legal reasoning by alluding to jazz improvisation’s logic and math-like elements accompanied by “invention, spontaneity, and emotional connection,” shaped by “both logic and experience.”58 Peter Margulies draws on the place of jazz to explore “outsider
innovations in music and legal thought.”59
Most of these works pay little attention to how the law is shaped by lawyers
and other legal actors and legal institutions, not just judges. They also do not
focus on the modal similarities of jazz improvisation and law analyzed here,
namely the pervasive reality that law arises and emerges in settings of contestation and sequential interaction where multiple parties seek to influence choices

50. See Frank, supra note 46, at 1260.
51. Id. at 1260–62.
52. Id. at 1263 (quoting Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.
1945)); id. at 1269–70 (discussing agencies’ roles).
53. Id. at 1264.
54. See generally SARA RAMSHAW, JUSTICE AS IMPROVISATION: THE LAW OF THE EXTEMPORE (2013).
55. See id. at 6–14, 35–55, 110–24, 134–35 (analyzing Derrida’s insights by weaving in conceptions and
practices of improvisation).
56. Calmore, supra note 13, at 2138.
57. See Sheila Simon, Jazz and Family Law: Structures, Freedoms, and Sound Changes, 42 IND. L. REV.
567, 568 (2009).
58. Susan S. Silbey & Patricia Ewick, The Double Life of Reason and the Law, 57 MIA. L. REV. 497, 501
(2003).
59. Peter Margulies, Doubting Doubleness, and All That Jazz: Establishment Critiques of Outsider Innovations in Music and Legal Thought, 51 MIA. L. REV. 1155, 1171–75 (1997) (focusing on “outsider innovation”
and responses to jazz innovations).
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that, in turn, shape the manifested law over time.60 Few engage methodological
debates where codified public law forms—constitutions, statutes, and regulations—are the key law in play.
Central to this Article’s claim is that the doing of law is not a cloistered
search for a settled thing, but instead—like the practices of collective jazz improvisation introduced next—involves a contested and sequential process that no
one person or institution controls or can wield in a truly final manner.61 Layers
of law and method choices, plus interacting institutions, collectively create a web
of constraints, but they also leave broad space for change, uncertainty, strategic
contestation, and selection from multiple tenable choices.
III. JAZZ IMPROVISATION: FREEDOM AND CONSTRAINED CHOICES IN A
SEQUENTIAL SYSTEM
This Part illuminates the art of jazz improvisation as a prelude to analysis
of how it shares modal and institutional attributes with the doing of law. It explores the law-improvisation analogy primarily from the perspective of musicians, focusing on the rules, traditions, and practices they draw on, are constrained by, but also transform, as they make improvisatory choices.
But what does it mean to improvise? In short, “improvisation” in the jazz
setting refers to a performer making on-the-spot creative choices that are not
planned or dictated in advance.62 It does not, however, mean creativity without
attention to musical form, changing contexts, or constraining rules and practices.
Neither jazz nor law involve just command and obedience. Instead, both are
shaped by history, context, sequentially revealed actions of others, and attention
to consequences of what remain constrained but ubiquitous choices.63 Improvisation, especially in the small ensemble bebop settings mainly focused upon here,
involves far more choice and dynamism than mere interpretation, but is not unstructured inspiration.64
This Article is benefited by a recent explosion of writing and materials illuminating the art and practices of improvisation.65 The teaching of jazz

60. Justice Holmes sometimes acknowledged how lawyers shape the law. See David Luban, The Bad Man
and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on Holmes’s The Path of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1547, 1556–57
(1997) (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Remarks to the Essex Bar, in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 48, 48–49 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1962)).
61. See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630,
662–67 (1957) (calling for broader contextual analysis to understand and develop law). I return in Part IV to
analysis of choice consequences and Fuller. See infra Part IV.
62. BERLINER, supra note 1, at 1–2 (discussing definitions of improvisation).
63. See generally FULLER, supra note 45; Ben Sidran, Talking Jazz: An Oral History (1995).
64. See Levinson & Balkin, supra note 28, at 1654 (dismissing jazz improvisation as sharing attributes
with legal work).
65. See generally BERLINER, supra note 1; SCOTT DEVEAUX, THE BIRTH OF BEBOP: A SOCIAL AND
MUSICAL HISTORY (1997); MONSON, supra note 1. For an insight-laden exploration of the nature of jazz improvisation, see Alessandro Duranti & Kenny Burrell, Jazz Improvisation: A Search for Hidden Harmonies and a
Unique Self, in 27 RICERCHE DI PSICOLOGIA 71, 72 (2004) (focusing attention on what musicians “say and do . . .
when they play jazz”).
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improvisation at top music schools and universities has also contributed to this
proliferation of analysis.66 Similarly, digitized releases of jazz masters’ work further illuminate the art of jazz improvisation and, with such radically varied performances, how improvisation really is there.67
For reasons explained more below, the period and styles of jazz improvisation that most share elements with the doing of law are the forms of small ensemble performance first emerging in the 1940s, especially with the rise of bebop, then modal improvisation (both within and outside the bebop genre), and
even variants of free or out jazz.68 The innovative work of Miles Davis and his
ensemble colleagues present sustained illustrative examples, but this Article also
draws upon many others’ insights and mastery.69
A.

The Song and Music

Jazz, like law, is usually rooted in a written or at least notated text that
shapes the musical performance. Some of the earliest recorded jazz and blues,
much coming out of the South, developed in a mainly unwritten tradition but
used recognizable common forms, often drawing on blues traditions and also
church music, especially more gospel-style music with call and response and
dramatic performance arcs prevalent in African American churches and communities.70
For most of the twentieth century and still today, however, written music is
the starting point for most jazz.71 Musicians often draw on what are referred to
as “real” or “fake” books that convert compositions into what usually is a single
page distillation.72 Different books recast selected pieces into suggested chords,
simplified or adjusted forms of the melody, and also arrangements.73 Ashley
Kahn, in his study of the jazz masterpiece, Kind of Blue, discusses how
66. In addition to the renowned Berkelee College of Music, top universities now study jazz improvisation.
For example, pianist Vijay Iyer now teaches about improvisation at Harvard, as does Ingrid Monson. See Alec
Wilkinson, Time Is a Ghost, NEW YORKER (Jan. 24, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/02/
01/time-is-a-ghost [https://perma.cc/E6JG-M6Y6].
67. Recent Miles Davis box sets of CDs illuminate changing improvisatory choices, both years or mere
days apart. See, e.g., MILES DAVIS & JOHN COLTRANE, THE FINAL TOUR (THE BOOTLEG SERIES, VOL. 6) (Columbia Records 2018) (offering varied performances within 3 nights of one week); MILES DAVIS, MILES DAVIS
AT NEWPORT 1955–75 (THE BOOTLEG SERIES VOL. 4) (Columbia Records 2015) (offering dramatically varied
performances over twenty years); MILES DAVIS QUINTET, LIVE IN EUROPE 1967 (Sony Music Entertainment
2011) (offering the Quintet’s varied performances over a single week in 1967).
68. See infra Section III.B.
69. See Amiri Baraka, Miles Davis: “One of the Great Mother Fuckers,” in A MILES DAVIS READER 63,
63 (Bill Kirchner ed., 1997).
70. DIZZY GILLESPIE WITH AL FRASER, TO BE, OR NOT . . . TO BOP 140–41 (1979) (describing bebop as
“blending our ideas into a new style of music” and drawing on “European harmony and music theory superimposed on our own knowledge from Afro-American musical tradition”); Statement of Horace Silver, in BEN
SIDRAN, TALKING JAZZ: AN ORAL HISTORY 138, 141 (1995) (tracing his study of “boogie-woogie and blues”
players, learning by ear, and “piano folios” of pianist Teddy Wilson performances).
71. See supra Section III.A.
72. Statement of Jack DeJohnette, in SIDRAN, supra note 70, at 386 (drummer and pianist describing his
listening, imitation, study of fake books, then mastery of tunes in “all the keys”).
73. See id.
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trumpeter, composer, and band leader Miles Davis reworked show tunes that
eventually became jazz standards.74 Davis loved the playing of pianist Ahmad
Jamal and asked his own pianist, Red Garland, to similarly emphasize their harmonic beauty.75 Fake books then adopted the Davis reconception of these pieces,
often in their recorded form.76 These and many other jazz tunes—often referred
to as “standards”—are eventually known by heart by experienced musicians.77
To know a tune means to know the melody, know the chords, usually know it in
several different or all keys, know improvisatory choices and challenges, and
often know others’ versions of the tune.78
As a result, the jazz standard version of such songs (or tunes) is often far
different from the composers’ original composition or earliest performances,
sometimes jettisoning parts of the original piece (especially introductory passages) or suggesting different chords (clusters of notes often played by a piano
or guitar) and voicings (the stacked series of chord notes that can be shifted in
order) than evident in the original.79 This musical distillation, however, is more
a process of composition and music theory than of the improvisation this Article
explores.
In performance, musicians will further adjust by changing keys, tempos,
adding variations, and making choices about a performance’s “pulse” and
“groove” in its collective creation.80 Such choices may accommodate the musicians’ abilities, but also can be part of the hybrid of cooperative and competitive
simultaneity that characterizes jazz improvisation.
B.

The Musical Conversation and Collective Creation

Especially with musicians playing in 1940s to 1960s foundational bebop
small ensemble settings—for example, performances by Dizzy Gillespie, Charlie
Parker, Clifford Brown, Sonny Rollins, Dexter Gordon, Miles Davis, Bill Evans,
and John Coltrane, among many others, and still followed today—the basics of
the musical “conversation” tend to follow a fairly constant form.81 This is not a
conversation in the sense of clean, sequential turns with silence of others. Overlap, polyphony, and mutual simultaneous adjustment are the norm, making vast
74. ASHLEY KAHN, KIND OF BLUE: THE MAKING OF A JAZZ MASTERPIECE 36, 42 (2000).
75. Id.
76. Statement of Jack DeJohnette, in SIDRAN, supra note 70, at 386.
77. See Duranti & Burrell, supra note 65, at 76–80 (discussing the “appropriation,” “transformation” and
remaking of familiar tunes known as “standards” into something “new and exciting”).
78. Statement of Illinois Jacquet, in GILLESPIE, supra note 70, at 147–48 (describing shift to bebop’s emphasis on “chord changes” and playing “the whole chord instead of the melody” and emphasizing “[y]ou have to
get into the books”).
79. KAHN, supra note 74, at 36 (discussing how Davis reshaped earlier compositions).
80. Davis gave his Bitches Brew musicians minimal guidance so to free up the improvisers, while with
Kind of Blue he sketched simple conceptions and provided modal scales. Id. at 96–99 (regarding Kind of Blue);
Duranti & Burrell, supra note 65, at 82–83 (discussing Davis’s practices).
81. Musicians often characterize improvisation as like a conversation, including when “you can turn a
mistake . . . into . . . a positive.” Duranti & Burrell, supra note 65, at 85 (quoting musicians Sherman Ferguson
and Kenny Burrell); Ramshaw, supra note 54, at 72–76, 83 (discussing improvisation’s conversational and collective elements and other key tools and forms wielded by musicians).
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performance variety the norm.82 At the highest levels of improvisational prowess, especially with the growing acceptance of more “out” and “free” styles of
jazz, many of the structures and practices described here are used but then transition into freer, less structured, interactive, on-the-spot musical choosing.83
As Charles Mingus commented, “you have to improvise on somethin’.”84
For both musicians and audiences, that framing “something” is critical to make
the improvisation apparent and successful.85 In other words, as with law, choices
are central, but are shaped by frames or constraints. In the small ensemble bebop
jazz form focused on here, the melody is usually played through once or twice,
but virtually never precisely as written.86 Sometimes the melody is only lightly
sketched.87 The exact rhythms and melodic lines and chord voicings will be varied, but the central melody is usually discernible, despite adjustments and embellishments.88
Some jazz greats view this initial statement of the melody and structure,
then building improvisational motifs over the course of an improvisation, as critical to allow the audience and other musicians to discern the improvisation that
follows.89 When less structured or when confusion takes over, musicians and the
audience alike may struggle. Vocalist Billie Holliday exhorted one of the great
jazz trombonists, Curtis Fuller, to play less and draw in the audience: “When you
play, you’re talking to people. So learn how to edit your thing.”90
After playing or sketching the melody, improvisation begins. Musicians
take turns in a leadership soloing role, developing their own improvised take on
the tune and the chords, then handing off the lead, soloing role to another musician.91 Sometimes the handoff is a seamless segue, but sometimes the choice is
to make the shift clear and somewhat abrupt.92
That someone is in the lead, in the sense of the musical foreground, does
not mean that others are not also improvising. The rhythm section of bass, drums,
and piano or guitar (or both) often collectively create an ever-changing, although
82. See supra Subsection III.C.1.
83. The Miles Davis Quintet from around 1960 adopted more aggressive, “freer” and “avant-garde” styles,
including a Davis request Herbie Hancock play with “no chords.” Statement of Herbie Hancock, in SIDRAN,
supra note 70, at 264–66. Hancock characterized these shifts as a move to “controlled freedom.” Statement of
Herbie Hancock, in BERLINER, supra note 1, at 341.
84. Statement of Charles Mingus, in KERNFELD, supra note 1, at 119 (quoting JANET COLEMAN & AL
YOUNG, MINGUS/MINGUS (1989)).
85. See id.
86. See supra Subsection III.C.2.
87. See Coleman, supra note 1, at 64.
88. See supra Section III.A.
89. BERLINER, supra note 1, at 264–67 (quoting musicians explaining need for balancing repetition, thematic development with “controlled risk taking”).
90. Giovanni Russonello, Curtis Fuller, 88, Master of Jazz, Whose Trombone Had a Big Majestic Sound,
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2021, at 29 (quoting Billie Holliday and Curtis Fuller, respectively).
91. Russonello describes Curtis Fuller’s interplay with John Coltrane for the tune, Blue Trane: “Mr.
Fuller’s five-chorus solo . . . begins by playing off the last few notes of the trumpeter Lee Morgan’s improvisation, as if curiously picking up an object a friend had just put down” before going into his own “spontaneous
repertoire . . . .” Id.
92. See supra Subsection III.C.3.
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still anchored, musical base over which a soloist works.93 The rhythm section
often determines the pulse, groove, and chord density that shapes the sound and
also degree of improvisatory freedom of the lead soloist.94
Because all musicians are adjusting in light of each other’s constrained but
unpredictable choices, actual rote repetition is a near impossibility. All members
of an improvising ensemble must be “so thoroughly familiar with the basic
framework of the tune that he or she can attend to what everyone else in the band
is doing.”95 Because ensemble jazz improvisation involves such simultaneous
choosing and interactive adjusting, it is akin to a “conversation.”96 The next Part
breaks down the building blocks of improvisatory choices in this conversation.
Radical performance changes with the same pieces and soloists at different
times illustrate the dynamic nature of musical improvisatory conversation. The
Miles Davis performances of the Mort Dixon and Ray Henderson tune, Bye Bye
Blackbird, offer a wonderful example.97 The 1955 studio version offers masterful
solos by Davis and John Coltrane, with their soloing referencing the melody and
closely hewing to the piece’s chords and chordal movement.98 When Davis and
Coltrane again toured in 1960, Bye Bye Blackbird was transformed.99 Davis starts
his 1960 solo with different notes, soloing arc, and motifs or themes, but in timbre and pacing still resembling the 1955 performance.100 The same is true of the
rhythm section.101
The latitude for change and creativity, yet within constraining structures, is
most evident when Coltrane takes the solo handoff from Davis.102 After brief
playing reminiscent of his 1955 solo, Coltrane shifts into a wholly different
gear.103 A torrent of notes, dissonance, and far freer and intense playing follows,
with contrasting honking and use of pedal tunes against a flurry of notes.104 He
draws on new insights into modal playing and additional chord notes, picking up
on ideas developed by Davis and pianist Bill Evans, which in turn built on music
93. Ingrid Monson focuses on the rhythm section shaping the groove and soloist choices. MONSON, supra
note 1, at 90–93 (1996) (quoting musicians likening a “groove” to “walking” with someone, “mutual feeling of
agreement on a pattern,” and like “getting into a bubble bath” and relaxing).
94. Saxophonist Johnny Griffin said the music of Thelonious Monk “box[ed] him in.” Statement of Johnny
Griffin, in SIDRAN, supra note 70, at 201–02. Saxophonist Sonny Rollins recalls John Coltrane as saying that if
you “miss a change with Monk’s music, it is like stepping into an elevator shaft when it’s empty.” Id. at 174.
Pianist Horace Silver kept music “simple” or with “open space” to provide soloists “open space for blowing.”
Id., at 143–45. See also infra Subsection IV.D.3 (applying these concepts to “many sources” statutory interpretation debate).
95. MONSON, supra note 1, at 83.
96. See BERLINER, supra note 1, at 348–86 (exploring the conversation characterization); id. at 386 (quoting musicians about “give and take” and “collective interplay”).
97. See MILES DAVIS, Bye Bye Blackbird, on ’ROUND ABOUT MIDNIGHT (Columbia Records 1957).
98. See id.
99. DAVIS & COLTRANE, supra note 67.
100. See id.; DAVIS, supra note 97.
101. DAVIS & COLTRANE, supra note 67; DAVIS, supra note 97.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Improvising with a pedal tone is, basically, hitting on the same bass note repeatedly while varying the
rest of the soloing note and rhythm choices. See BERLINER, supra note 1, at 361 (discussing “pedal points” and
resulting soloist “harmonic latitude”).
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theory innovations in jazz and classical music.105 By 1960, Coltrane had transformed these ideas into his own substantially transmogrified and distinctive
form.106 Both recordings feature the same piece and same lead musicians, yet
vastly different musical outputs emerge.
C.

Explaining the Basics of Jazz Improvisation

This Section breaks down key elements, building blocks, and choices prevalent in jazz improvisation, including tracing of changing practices. As with
law’s modes and materials, these improvisational key elements are both sources
of constraint but also resources drawn upon with creativity.
1.

Melodic Embellishment to Bebop

The very nature of jazz improvisation has been ever-changing. The earliest
recorded jazz improvisation involved little more than musicians offering variations on, and sometimes mere embellishments of, a song’s melody.107 Much was
deeply rooted in the blues, but it also drew on gospel music, African music and
rhythms, Tin Pan Alley music, ragtime music, marching band music, Roma music, Middle Eastern music, show tunes, and classics of the American Songbook,
classical music theory, and then a growing and rich array of original compositions by jazz musicians themselves.108 At virtually all stages of the development
of jazz, leading innovators and performers have been African American.109
Melodic embellishments remain a form of jazz improvisation, especially
among singers, but today would be viewed as unimpressive if a musician’s entire
skill set. By the time of the innovations of New Orleans jazz, musicians such as
Jelly Roll Morton, Sidney Bechet, Louis Armstrong and Belgian-born RomaniFrench guitarist Django Reinhardt created, enriched, and then provided practices
and lessons for others to study and imitate.110 Virtually all jazz musicians credit
Louis Armstrong as foundational (at least in recorded form) for his sophisticated
work with melody, chords, and a dazzling use of time, harmonic creativity, and
rhythm.111 Armstrong’s innovations influenced transitional players, like
105. See DAVIS & COLTRANE, supra note 67; DAVIS, supra note 97.
106. Davis recounts Coltrane’s leap in Statement of Miles Davis, in SIDRAN, supra note 70, at 10–12 (recalling “I gave him those chords and he just went . . . he wasn’t playing like that before” and then Coltrane
developed his own “sound” and put his own “stamp” on it) (emphasis in original).
107. See Duranti & Burrell, supra note 65, at 76–78.
108. See BERLINER, supra note 1, at 489 (discussing national and ethnic contributions to jazz and characterizing it as substantially an African American contribution to music); Statement of Max Roach, in SIDRAN,
supra note 70, at 78 (discussing influences and mentioning ragtime and marching band instruments and music as
important influences); Statement of Horace Silver, in id. at 141 (mentioning importance of “boogie-woogie and
blues” to forms of jazz he developed).
109. Bebop innovator and trumpeter Dizzy Gillespie highlighted African rhythms in jazz. Statement of Gillespie, in SIDRAN, supra note 70, at 29–30 (focusing on the “looseness” of African rhythms incorporated into
jazz, beat accents, and the pervasive “triplet form”).
110. See, e.g., Louis Armstrong, The Decca Singles 1935–1946 (Mosaic Records 2017).
111. See KERNFELD, supra note 1, at 24, 189 (referring to Armstrong’s “overwhelming impact”); Statement
of Gil Evans, in SIDRAN, supra note 70, at 23 (stating until Miles Davis, no one had “change[d] the tone of the
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Coleman Hawkins, who preceded bebop but contributed to many of its elements.112 Innovative transitional greats like Hawkins and guitarist Charlie Christian took New Orleans jazz and early or traditional forms of improvisation and
began to develop the phrasing and less melodically constrained improvisation
practices that, with further innovations, became known as bebop.113
Bebop became dominant by the late 1940s, at least among the top jazz musicians. Bebop remains part of the enduring heart of jazz improvisation.114 The
label “bebop” remains contested, as sometimes is the term “jazz”; many musicians resist labels to describe their genre or type of music.115 Pioneering bebop
drummer Kenny Clarke used the term “bebop” to describe the musical form he,
Gillespie, and Charlie Parker were central in developing, but also said it was a
label of journalists.116 “It was just modern music . . . just music,” he stated.117
Others called it “progressive music,” contrasted with “traditional playing” or
“old patterns” of soloing in earlier Louisiana and Dixieland styles.118 Pianist
Mary Lou Williams called the development of bebop simply “[w]hen the thing
started.”119 She said “bop came along with a more modern thing, and the blues
and the swing part, but it was just more colorful.”120 Miles Davis called hearing
a live performance of early bebop by its two greatest innovators, Dizzy Gillespie
and Charlie Parker, the “greatest feeling I ever had in my life.”121
While early “traditional” jazz improvisation centered on the melody, bebop-style improvisations quickly leave the melody behind and free soloists to
choose from more structural or architectural elements.122 As Miles Davis noted,
bebop often involves “a lot of real fast notes and chord changes.”123 Gillespie

trumpet” since Armstrong); Statement of Phil Woods, in id. at 188 (stating that “without” Armstrong “we
wouldn’t have any expressiveness at all”); Statement of Wynton Marsalis, in id. at 346–48 (discussing rhythmic
and harmonic innovations in jazz, how Armstrong and his ensembles “adher[ed] to the form,” and linking Armstrong’s playing “flat nines, flat fives, flat sixes” to Duke Ellington’s music and classical composer Arnold
Schoenberg).
112. For explanations of Armstrong’s influence, see BERLINER, supra note 1, at 124. Scott DeVeaux focuses
on bebop and the contributions of Hawkins. See DEVEAUX, supra note 65, at 72–115 (analyzing musical structures and Hawkins’ innovations).
113. See DEVEAUX, supra note 65, at 72–115.
114. If measured by earnings or sales, characterization of the “dominant” forms of jazz might differ. See
KAHN, supra note 74, at 63 (discussing implications of corporate music labeling).
115. Pianist and composer Chick Corea stated “there is always a fusion of sorts taking place. All this means
is a continual development—a continual merging of different streams.” Giovanni Russonello, Chick Corea, Jazz
Keyboardist and Innovator, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/
11/arts/music/chick-corea-dead.html [https://perma.cc/J8YA-ALAZ].
116. GILLESPIE, supra note 70, at 142.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 145–48 (quoting saxophonist Illinois Jacquet about evolution of jazz, Gillespie, and need to “get
your own creation, your own painting, or your own style”).
119. Id. at 149 (quoting Mary Lou Williams).
120. Id. at 150.
121. He adds, “with my clothes on.” MILES DAVIS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MILES DAVIS WITH QUINCY
TROUPE 7 (Vincent Virga ed., 1989).
122. See, e.g., BERLINER, supra note 1, at 128–29 (discussing melodic improvisation transition to “vertical
and horizontal musical elements” and mix of “chord and non-chord tones”).
123. See DAVIS, supra note 121, at 219.
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and others recall a tour in the South where audiences were puzzled and somewhat
hostile to these early bebop forms.124 In the words of pianist Fred Hersch, bebop
“is like the music of Mozart or Bach,” due to its use of longer “unbroken” musical phrases, but also because there are “little things that talk in the music.”125 The
tools, resources, and constraints of bebop improvisation follow.
2.

Chords, Scales, and Modal Playing

Chords, the sequence of chords, and sometimes melodic moves accompanying those chords, remain both resources and constraints for the improviser.126
The following relationship of chords and improvisation is critical to the balance
of choice and constraint—what Horace Silver called “freedom within [] organization”—that pervades jazz improvisation.127 Each chord states and often implies
a stacked or sequential series of notes that would, if played along with the chord,
create what could be called a harmonious sound.128 But improvisers also work
with dissonance, unusual music intervals, “tension and release,” and other means
of heightening drama, so one cannot just talk of harmony or definite confined
choices.129 Bebop musicians innovated based on music theory, deriving additional notes and chord structures not used in earlier forms of jazz.130
Varied chord voicings can create a substantially different sound and music
movement. Note choices can simplify or add chord ambiguity, complexity, or
dissonance, which both challenge and provide opportunities for improvisation.131
Chord density, voicings, and detail have implications for contemporary debates
over interpreting and working with legal texts, as explored below.132 Pared-down
ensembles or chord choices or note omissions create extra space and freedom for
the improviser.133 More fully voiced chords and denser accompaniment will
force a soloist into more particular directions chosen by the accompanists.134

124. Dancer Fayard Nicholas recalls Southern audiences at first were unhappy and “dumbfounded at first”
because they “couldn’t understand” or dance to “this bebop music.” Of that tour, Gillespie concedes “people
weren’t ready for bebop in a big context.” GILLESPIE, supra note 70, at 228–30.
125. Statement of Fred Hersch, in BERLINER, supra note 1, at 157.
126. Jacquet focused on this shift to chords, featured soloists, and away from melody and simultaneous
Dixieland-style “all playing together.” GILLESPIE, supra note 70, at 146–47.
127. Statement of Horace Silver, in SIDRAN, supra note 70, at 143 (quoting Silver).
128. See Statement of Jackie McLean, in id. at 128–30 (discussing these improvisational choices).
129. See BERLINER, supra note 1, at 198, 201–02, 211–12 (explaining tension and release).
130. See GILLESPIE, supra note 70, at 92 (discussing how discovery of the “flatted fifth” changed his “musical conception,” other “pretty notes in our music,” and showing them to Davis); id. at 135–36 (discussing work
with Thelonious Monk on chord theory).
131. See Duranti & Burrell, supra note 65, at 84–85 (discussing “tension” and “release,” correction of mistakes, and how improvisers “paint ourselves . . . in and out of corners”) (quoting Jeff Clayton); KAHN, supra note
74, at 28 (quoting Davis that improvisation is a “high-wire act”).
132. In analogous work, Kevin P. Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning, 134 HARV. L. REV. 726 (2020), questions claims of determinacy in “ordinary meaning” methods and finds divergent experiment results with dictionaries and “legal corpus linguistics.”
133. See Coleman, supra note 1, at 64 (discussing freedom provided with absence of piano chords).
134. See DAVIS, supra note 121, at 275 (describing Herbie Hancock as playing “chords [that] were too
thick” and with “too many notes”).
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Relatedly, each player’s sensibility and skill set vary, further requiring musicians’ mutual adjustments. Importantly, something that is literally correct—the
“phrase follows the rule” in the sense of conforming to rules of music theory—
can, nonetheless, “be wrong to play[]” given the musical contexts and choices of
other.135
Scale-based choices also are central to improvisation. Each chord implies
or works alongside a scale of notes, which provide a larger number of musical
choices.136 Musicians will sometimes study a tune’s many structures—at a minimum melody, chords, alternative chord substitutions, and chord sequences—
and construct tune-specific scales that work for improvisation over substantial
segments of the tune.137
Much jazz is rooted in blues chords—the familiar so-called one, four, and
five chords that work with particular scales over most or all of a blues-structured
piece.138 Even when playing a more complicated jazz standard like All the Things
You Are, many musicians will add “blue” notes to their choices.139 This is true
with omitted note scales like the pentatonic scale associated with blues, adding
the so-called “blue note” between the fourth and fifth note on a major scale. Indeed, musicians’ addition of that single note to their improvisations—“the flatted
fifth”—provided a key new element in bebop.140 Shifting between scale forms
itself can create a dramatic effect, as can dropping in musical quotes and ideas
from all forms of music.141
Theoretical insights led to the emergence of modal scales embraced by
Miles Davis. Most famously in his Kind of Blue album, Davis developed tunes
that utilized the modal scale-linked innovation he, arranger Gil Evans, and pianist and composer Bill Evans developed from studying other music theorists,
especially George Russell, thinking at the keyboard, and also studying classical
music.142 With the modal shift, musicians did not have to adjust note selections
with each new chord.143 Instead, Davis provided simplified scales that would fit
over a sequence of chords, giving musicians space to solo more freely.144 These

135. Statement of Barry Harris, in BERLINER, supra note 1, at 249; Statement of James Moody, in id. at 104
(explaining that your “ear would just reject” something “out of context[]” like a “scream [on a] peaceful street”).
136. See id. at 196–98 (discussing “contrasts,” “sense of flow,” and balance of “repetition and variation”).
137. Statement of Tommy Flanagan, in id. at 105 (by studying transcribed solos, Flanagan found ways “you
can make one little phrase cover three or four chords”); Statement of Harold Ousley, in id. at 224 (discussing
musicians’ constructing scales for particular tunes).
138. See id. at 65.
139. See id. at 226.
140. Davis internalized that note into his playing choices. See RAMSHAW, supra note 54, at 78 (quoting John
Szwed).
141. Dizzy Gillespie identified similarities between jazz harmonies and Ravel. Statement of Dizzy Gillespie,
in SIDRAN, supra note 70, at 28.
142. See Ron Hart, As ‘Kind of Blue’ Turns 60, Drummer Jimmy Cobb Shares Miles Davis Memories,
BILLBOARD (Aug. 17, 2019), https://www.billboard.com/music/music-news/miles-davis-kind-of-blue-drummerjimmy-cobb-shares-miles-davis-8527648/ [https://perma.cc/K7VN-4R99] (quoting Jimmy Cobb regarding
sources of the album’s theory innovations).
143. See KAHN, supra note 74, at 68.
144. See id. at 66–75 (tracing modal jazz development).
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scales have different note intervals, with each creating a distinctive sound.145 Bill
Evans, Ahmad Jamal, McCoy Tyner, and Herbie Hancock kept developing this
modal concept.146 John Coltrane embraced modal improvisation and incorporated it into his ever-evolving saxophone mastery.147 Such modal playing now is
ubiquitous in jazz.148
3.

Rhythm and Time

Improvising musicians must also make individual and collective choices
about the time or rhythmic element. Musicians must choose where in each beat
to place their notes, with collective musical meshing requiring all in the ensemble
to share that feel.149 Musicians often try to create that “swing,” and have a sort
of rhythmic “flow” or feel that “makes you want to dance . . . to move.”150 Jazz
involves certain prevalent rhythmic and pulse-like attributes, with a more rolling,
triplet-like and syncopated feel than other forms of music with improvisatory
elements such as rock and roll, blues, or classical organ playing.151
Musicians also develop their own distinctive approach to time, tone, and
how they play around the beat or vary the duration of their notes. Some musicians, perhaps most famously Charlie Parker and John Coltrane, could play rapid,
almost inseparable strings of notes that worked with a song’s chords.152 Dexter
Gordon favored improvising that built on chord structures with immense variety
and creation of new melodies, all the while playing far, far behind the beat.153
But none sounded like the other. Other musicians—for example Bill Evans,
Wynton Kelly, Charlie Haden, or Julian Lage today—often adopt a more understated manner reminiscent of the spare and mid-range playing for which Miles
Davis was most famous.154 Other greats, with trumpeter Clifford Brown a notable example, laid out beautiful melodic but varied and often rapid improvised
lines, calling to mind classical music forms.155

145. See id. at 69.
146. See id. at 72.
147. Statement of Miles Davis, in SIDRAN, supra note 70, at 10–12 (describing Coltrane’s contributions,
musicians’ embrace of modal conceptions, and chord choices influenced by classical composers Ravel, Rachmaninov, Bartok, and Katchutorian).
148. See id.
149. Bassist Rufus Reid only meshed with Dexter Gordon when adopting what felt like an overly dramatic,
inappropriate “laid back” feel, to which Gordon responded “[t]hat’s it!” Statement of Rufus Reid, in BERLINER,
supra note 1, at 424–25.
150. Statement of Fred Hersch, in id. at 244–45.
151. Id. at 302–03 (discussing musicians’ working on sharing pulse and rhythmic conceptions, including
accents and triplet phrasing).
152. Mary Lou Williams says Coltrane would squeeze in “just millions of notes . . . . in one bar” but still
viewed it as “bop.” GILLESPIE, supra note 70, at 150 (quoting Williams).
153. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (describing Gordon’s sense of time).
154. See DAVIS, supra note 121, at 220 (describing how he heard and contrasted with others playing faster
or higher).
155. Statement of Wynton Marsalis, in SIDRAN, supra note 70, at 348 (describing Brown’s mastery); Statement of Wynton Marsalis, in id. at 348 (stating Brown “played ten times more trumpet than me or anybody I’ve
heard”).
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Mastery, Persuasive Structure, and Choice Among Constraints

Skillful improvisers hence draw on an array of theoretical approaches that
both generate opportunities and constrain. They know the melody, chords, and
what scales and note intervals will work. They must attend to others’ choices,
including others’ rhythmic conception and the collectively created “pulse,” taking into account past, concurrent, and anticipated musical choices of others.156
All must decide how to contribute to the musical “conversation.”157 Such improvisation thus requires a highly technical set of skills, listening prowess, and
superb context-rich judgment; it requires “listening with a question.”158
Improvising mastery also requires huge hours of solo practice often referred
to as “woodshedding.”159 Musicians will also often in advance work out collective performance conceptions.160 Others might just sketch ideas, heightening creativity and careful listening on the spot.161 Performers will study and learn others’ creative or effective riffs—clusters of musical motifs that can fit in an array
of settings—often integrating them into their own playing.162 Practice and efforts
to master challenges are a constant. For example, John Coltrane, when not playing on the stage with Miles Davis, would sometimes go off into nearby backstage
areas and test musical possibilities, “run[ning] over chord progressions and sequences” until the practice generated “a song[,] or songs[,]” with each a “little
musical problem.”163 Similarly, bebop innovator Dizzy Gillespie praised the
mastery of guitarist John Collins: “he knew a thousand ways to play one
thing.”164 This capacity to do many things, to solve “musical problem[s],” and
handle with skill each other’s unpredictable but constrained choices, are the essence of an improvising master.165
With such shifts to chord and scale-based improvisation, the music moved
away from close hewing to a composer’s creation. Melodic embellishments still
might appropriately be characterized as a mere “interpretation.”166 Bebop improvising, however, is more centrally an act of creation, yet that creation must still
hew to these more structural elements of the composer’s music; it is an “act of
156. See generally SIDRAN, supra note 70.
157. BERLINER, supra note 1, at 362–63 (describing listening’s importance to create “exciting moments of
instantaneous conversation”).
158. See Levine School of Music, supra note 12, at 47:25.
159. Sonny Rollins famously practiced on a New York City bridge, to “go back in the woodshed and get
these things together.” Statement of Sonny Rollins, in SIDRAN, supra note 70, at 176; BERLINER, supra note 1, at
115 (discussing woodshedding).
160. Statement of Art Blakey, in SIDRAN, supra note 70, at 104–05 (discussing how a band can “begin to
know each other, trust each other . . . come together”).
161. For Kind of Blue, Miles Davis provided lightly sketched musical ideas, including modal scales. See
KAHN, supra note 74, at 68. Bill Evans saw those sessions as akin to Japanese art created in single flowing
creation. Bill Evans, Kind of Blue: Improvisation in Jazz, ALBUM LINER NOTES, http://albumlinernotes.
com/Kind_of_Blue.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2022) [https://perma.cc/Z9VE-RMGN].
162. BERLINER, supra note 1, at 102–05 (describing musicians learning from others’ ideas).
163. Statement of John Coltrane, in KAHN, supra note 74, at 161.
164. GILLESPIE, supra note 70, at 138 (emphasis added).
165. See generally id.
166. See generally id.
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fusion and transformation.”167 Constrained choices made on the spot create new
harmonic possibilities, tensions, and constraints.168
Structures akin to narrative and creation of drama are central to each lead
soloist’s contributions to collective improvisation. Like good writing and effective legal advocacy, important passages in jazz improvisation must be set up so
they will be noticed. Lead solos tend to have an arc, with motivic elements, structure, quotes of other players and familiar tunes, and dramatic ebbs and flows that
mesh with others’ collective choices.169 An effective performance is persuasive,
pulling the other musicians and the audience along. Roy Eldridge’s solos were,
in the words of later trumpeter, Thad Jones, constructed like a “thrilling mystery
novel that you can’t put down.”170 Eldridge, in turn, modeled his performance
aspirations on Louis Armstrong’s solos: Armstrong “built his solos like a book—
first an introduction, then chapters, each one coming out of the one before and
building to a climax.”171
In contrast, a blizzard of unending notes or mechanical playing please no
one.172 Pauses, empty spaces, and spare conceptions can sometimes be the most
compelling. Miles Davis was particularly known for playing less, using space
and silence to create music of dramatic beauty, especially in contrast to others
around him.173 In contrast, the dazzling jazz guitarist, Mike Stern, often plays
with long streams of notes that in feel and technique blend bebop, blues, and
even rock styles.174 Davis, who included Stern in one of his 1980s bands, admired
Stern’s playing and mastery, but quipped Stern should “go to Notes Anonymous”
because “like a lot of guys do, [he] play[s] too many . . . notes.”175
Improvising norms and practices change over time. Early bebop and cool
jazz styles, such as heard in recordings of Miles Davis’s quartets and quintets
prior to the pathbreaking Kind of Blue album, have a clear lead improvising soloist, with less improvising variation behind the soloist.176 By the 1960s, Miles
Davis’ renowned quintet embraced a far busier style of improvisation, with all

167. See BERLINER, supra note 1, at 138–45 (describing musicians’ individualized voice and vocabulary).
168. See RAMSHAW, supra note 54, at 78 (discussing these practices and choices).
169. Guitarist Julian Lage suggests three main improvisatory strategies: time and chords; motif development; and freer, unstructured choices, and with effective soloists drawing on all three. Levine School of Music,
supra note 12, at 47:50–52:20.
170. Statement of Thad Jones, in BERLINER, supra note 1, at 262.
171. Statement of Roy Eldridge, in id. at 262.
172. Dizzy Gillespie spoke of desire to “waste no notes.” Statement of Dizzy Gillespie, in SIDRAN, supra
note 70, at 30–31.
173. See Baraka, supra note 69 (quoting Davis as telling musicians to consider “what I can leave out,” create
“warmth in the midst of fire,” contrasted with bluesier, funkier playing by Cannonball Adderley and “thunder
and lightning” and “honking” of John Coltrane). Davis attributed his sparse sound to childhood trips to his grandfather’s Arkansas farm. DAVIS, supra note 121, at 28–29 (describing “that blues, church, back-road funk kind of
thing, that southern, midwestern, rural sound and rhythm . . . . after dark when the owls came out hooting”).
174. Media Information and Assets for Mike Stern, Biography, MIKE STERN, http://www.mikestern.org/media.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2022) [https://perma.cc/76S8-7ZNX].
175. Statement of Miles Davis, in SIDRAN, supra note 70, at 14.
176. See KAHN, supra note 74, at 67.
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musicians adjusting tunes and creating new challenges, night after night.177 Conceptions about instruments’ roles also change.178
The following is important to this Article’s analogical exploration of law
and jazz improvisation: these many practices, skills, and collective choices make
prediction impossible, but provide many criteria against which to assess and
compare performances.179 Each player’s contribution must fit, with such fit or
congruence requiring skill with these building-block improvisatory elements,
knowing the musical forms, plus contextual careful listening to others’
choices.180 Thus, despite this immense variation and pervasive choosing, bebop
improvisation involves a highly skilled and technical practice filled with constraints.181 Great variation in choices and collective creation can also create clear
mistakes or performance “clams” or “clunkers,” as further explored below.182
Why, however, does this Article focus on bebop ensembles, with little attention to the many solo jazz masters? Solo playing lacks the interactions and
sequentially developed constraints and unexpected moments that pervade both
law and ensemble improvisation.183 A solo pianist can display the apex of improvisational prowess, but no one else limits the performance choices. Similarly,
a fully orchestrated written form can be jazz, but lacks the improvisational choosing with analogues in the law. Law involves fundamentally collective, sequential
tasks in settings of uncertainty and often contestation, with constant choices
about frames, institutions, and which legal issues to emphasize. Law never involves a single person’s choices made in isolation and with outcome-determinative self-control. And law virtually never just involves reading and following.
For that reason, this Article will continue to focus principally on small ensemblebased bebop jazz improvisation as the illuminating analogue.
D.

Musical Mistakes and Fit

To illuminate the law-jazz analogy, it is also crucial to discuss the concept
of mistakes. Jazz improvisation involves many choices that could comply with
all of the rules.184 Improvising with a melodically anchored focus, or based on
chord notes or scales linked to each chord, or via modal conceptions, or a blend
of all, could lead to many correct, appropriate choices.185 But others’ choices will
dramatically shape what works.186 When musicians speak of an ensemble that
177. DAVIS, supra note 121, at 273–75.
178. BERLINER, supra note 1, at 130–35 (describing changes in instrument conceptions).
179. See RAMSHAW, supra note 54, at 83.
180. Id.
181. Ramshaw demolishes the “wild” characterization of jazz improvisation, also presenting critics’ debates
over bebop. Id. at 4, 54–70; see also id. at 72–76 (reviewing elements of the “jazz form” and structure).
182. Statement of George Benson, in SIDRAN, supra note 70, at 335 (discussing his mistakes and development).
183. See RAMSHAW, supra note 54, at 83.
184. See id. at 73.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 85 (quoting music critics about individual and collective creative endeavor in musical improvisation).
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“gels” or becomes “tight,” they are talking about effective musical communication and a shared conception of the music.187 The fit, gelling, or congruence element in improvisation involves far more than just attention to what notes or
scales are literally in harmony with, or fit, a piece’s design.
For example, Max Roach recalled Dizzy Gillespie noting a collective musical breakdown, and just stepping out of his solo until the band got back into
sync.188 Miles Davis’ Second Quintet blended bebop and cool jazz with increasingly prevalent excursions into elements of free or out jazz, which they referred
to as “time, no changes.”189 Such efforts sometimes fell apart in this setting of,
in Herbie Hancock’s words, “controlled freedom.”190 With the dazzling, more
driving teenage drummer, Tony Williams, cool, serene tunes became breakneck
speed challenges; Davis said some performances were a shambles, but others
thrilling.191
A few simple jazz improvisation illustrations might illuminate this seeming
incongruity of rule-laden constraining systems that create pervasive choices,
many ways to err, but also criteria for comparative assessment. For example,
several bebop classics were constructed over chords of early traditional jazz
pieces.192 One could play the bebop tune with a conception working with bebop
practices and theory generally credited to Charlie Parker or Dizzy Gillespie.193
One could also play in a 1930s or 1940s traditional style and all notes would
mesh with the chords.194 Yet that playing would quite clearly be wrong or, in
comparative assessment, weak.
Similarly, Miles Davis, in his autobiography, talks about “cutting heads” in
jam sessions, where musicians would competitively throw out musical challenges to test the fluency and skill of each other.195 Error would eventually result,
or the relative skill levels would become apparent.196 Again, sequence, cooperation, and competition, with comparative contextual assessments of competence,
were part of such jam sessions practices and challenges.
Or, to return to the earlier Miles Davis Second Quintet example, former
muted and melodic tunes were by 1960 now taken apart and veered into less
187. Bassist Gary Peacock described his famed trio with Keith Jarrett and Jack DeJohnette in such terms:
“There were three individuals, but there was one mind expressing itself.” Giovanni Russonello, Gary Peacock,
Master Jazz Bassist, Is Dead at 85, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/09/arts/music/gary-peacock-dead-at-85.html [https://perma.cc/6VCG-TSC3] (obituary) (quoting Peacock).
188. Statement of Max Roach, in BERLINER, supra note 1, at 381–82.
189. Coleman, supra note 1, at 88, 136–37 (discussing Davis’ embrace of this innovation).
190. Id. at 93 (characterizing improvising as like “walking a tightrope”); id. at 95–96 (discussing “mistakes,” inadvertent new possibilities, and “disast[ers]”); see also BERLINER, supra note 1, at 382 (saying Davis’s
Second Quintet could “fall apart” but (according to Herbie Hancock) then “Davis with his playing would center
it . . . tie it all together . . . and get the thing to grooving so hard”).
191. DAVIS, supra note 121, at 264 (describing Williams’ changing “every night” and “you had to be real
alert . . . or he’d lose you in a second”).
192. See DEVEAUX, supra note 65, at 7.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See generally DAVIS, supra note 121.
196. Both Coltrane and Davis periodically dove back into study and practice to develop greater mastery.
KAHN, supra note 74, at 166.
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structured directions, dynamically creating different versions night to night.197 If
an early 1950s Miles Davis stepped into his own later Second Quintet and tried
to use those earlier 1950s more formal conceptions of his own compositions, it
would not work. The collective and changing conceptions of the tunes and modes
of improvisation had moved on.
Hence, jazz improvisation involves many elements beyond some rulebound conception of music focused just on one correct thing, or what might be
correct under literal or rigid chord-based theories of music, or with close attention only to an original composition. There are many ways to be right and do
well, but also many ways to fail or perform poorly.198 Indeed, rigid sticking to
some earlier conception when surrounded by others’ different modes and choices
is one of the few ways a performer can be sure to be “wrong.”199 Prediction of
future “right” choices—whether within one performance or years later—is impossible in a setting of true collective improvisation. Congruence or fit, yet with
great room for choice and dynamism, creates many ways to be wrong. Pervasive
choosing and change does not means lacking in rules and constraints.
E.

A Note Regarding Free Improvisation and Law

As alluded to above, jazz improvisation has for over fifty years involved
varying degrees of “free” or “out” playing.200 Such improvisation hews little to
the rulebound constraints shaping bebop jazz ensemble improvisation. Coltrane’s exuberant solo turn in Europe on Bye Bye Blackbird is an early example
of improvisation integrating free soloing approaches against a more structured
form.201 Freer forms or collective turns are also sometimes embraced by ensembles or even the whole form of a musician’s output, as discussed above regarding
Davis’s famed late 1960s Second Quintet.202
This sort of shift into freer or out forms of improvisation, but building from
a known tune, might seem like the antithesis of law. It is less law-like than bebop,
but free jazz arguably shares much with how the law actually evolves, especially
in its less principled or defensible forms. As detailed below with legal examples,
even in codified law settings, uncoordinated actions of many actors and institutions sequentially will cue up new questions and opportunities.203 Law does not
snap back to some preordained form, but in a linear, sequential manner will develop and change, often in unpredictable ways.204 In this respect, freer jazz forms
can unfold much like law.
197. Davis emphasizes the band’s varied performances, break-neck tempos, and move away from structured
performances. See DAVIS, supra note 121, at 263–66, 268, 273–80.
198. GILLESPIE, supra note 70, at 151 (praising Charlie Parker’s mastery, with “deep, deep notes, as deep
as anything Beethoven ever wrote . . . . He’d play other tunes inside the chords of the original melody, and they
were always right”).
199. See RAMSHAW, supra note 54, at 83.
200. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
202. See Coleman, supra note 1, at 51–57.
203. See infra Section IV.D.
204. See infra Section IV.A.
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Other forms of more unbridled “free” or “out” jazz are harder to link to
law’s practices, especially if musicians cannot work with the skills and forms of
improvisational constraint. Miles Davis famously derided Ornette Coleman’s
early playing as showing he “could play only one way back then,” “with no kind
of training,” playing with “no kind of form or structure . . . just a lot of notes for
notes’ sake.”205 Law is virtually never akin to these more fully out or free forms.
Choice, sequence, unpredictability, and many actors are characteristics of jazz
and law, but the “conversations” and forms of law, like bebop ensemble playing,
virtually always start with attention to sources of constraint, although with varying degrees of integrity, thoroughness, and success.206
F.

The Audience, Competition, and Commerce

A brief foray into the role of competition, the audience, and commerce further illuminates the dynamics driving creativity both within a musical moment
and over time. It also provides a further analogy to explain the dynamism and
choices that shape law’s path.
One could idealize music as just about the artistry, but professional musicians must make a living, usually relying on a mix of recording sales and live
performance.207 Musicians strive to keep offering something that is new.208
While cooperative listening and choosing is central to jazz improvisation, competition also sparks change and success.209 Skilled musicians nudge each other
to avoid pat repetition and engage musical challenges.210 Improvisatory prowess
is central to distinction in jazz.211 Bassist, composer, and band leader Charles
Mingus dressed down a soloist in his band for repeating himself: “play something
different. This is jazz . . . . You played that last night and the night before.”212
Competition, even in the highly cooperative context of ensemble improvisation, will often lead to innovation and improvement.213 Master drummer Max
Roach said of Miles Davis, “Miles just shows several aspects of being creative.
If you’re being creative, you can’t be like you were yesterday.”214 Davis credited
205. DAVIS, supra note 121, at 250–51.
206. See infra Part V (discussing the link of methodological consistency, integrity and consequential congruence).
207. Dizzy Gillespie left the musically innovative Edgar Hayes band to the more commercially successful
Cab Calloway. GILLESPIE, supra note 70, at 96–97.
208. Statement of Illinois Jaquet, in GILLESPIE, supra note 70, at 148 (discussing innovations of “bebop”
but questioning the label).
209. Gillespie describes his chordal innovations, ideas of Thelonious Monk, work with Miles Davis, and
compares the relative skills and contributions of jazz masters. Id. at 91–92 (discussing the “flatted fifth”); id. at
94 (discussing drummers’ contributions); id. at 134–37 (discussing Monk); id. at 137–38 (discussing innovative
guitar style of Charlie Christian and bassist Oscar Pettiford’s adoption of it).
210. BERLINER, supra note 1, at 378 (recounting Davis telling his musicians not to use “routine maneuvers”).
211. Id. at 206 (discussing musicians’ improvisatory “vocabulary” and need to avoid “habituated and uninspired use”); id. at 207 (quoting pianist Fred Hersch about need to “[t]ry something else [and] [b]e resourceful”)
212. Id. at 271.
213. See DAVIS, supra note 121, at 262–64.
214. Baraka, supra note 69, at 72.
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Tony Williams and others in the Second Quintet with forcing him to redouble
his musical intensity.215 Amiri Baraka recounts Miles Davis exhorting John Coltrane to share creative innovations with Cannonball Adderley.216 Davis asked his
musicians to go beyond the safe and certain, to be creative and in the moment.217
Even the greatest musicians encounter challenges and need to redouble
their efforts. Miles Davis recalls ensembles and jam sessions that left him “lost”
or required him to “practice[] and come out playing as hard as I could”.218 After
New York City newcomer, Julian “Cannonball” Adderley, dazzled the City’s
best musicians in impromptu guest appearances, he was invited to join Miles
Davis’s band.219 Other emerging saxophone giants were dejected and went back
to work: Phil Woods and Jackie McLean said Adderley was “the baddest thing
we’d ever heard.”220 Similarly, Sonny Rollins has long been famous for his fountain of creativity in improvisatory battles.221 He duked it out with a young
Wynton Marsalis in the 1980s; in that and other settings, Rollins would shift
gears, forcing others to listen and move with him.222 Rollins and Coltrane each,
at different points, dazzled and intimidated the other with newly developed prowess.223

215. See DAVIS, supra note 121, at 262–64 (discussing Williams and the need to be “real alert” or “he’d
lose you in a second”).
216. Baraka, supra note 69, at 67 (quoting Davis as saying “I told Trane to show [Adderley] and stop him
from accenting the first beat”).
217. DAVIS, supra note 121, at 220 (discussing Davis asking his musicians to use “imagination, be more
creative, more innovative”).
218. Id. at 101–02 (recounting being initially “lost” with Parker’s innovations); id. at 146 (discussing jam
session competition).
219. KAHN, supra note 74, at 49.
220. Statement of Phil Woods, in SIDRAN, supra note 70, at 188–89.
221. David Marchese, Sonny Rollins Is at Peace. But He Regrets Trying to One-Up Coltrane, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/24/magazine/sonny-rollins-interview.html
[https://perma.cc/4AXV-M4M4] (commenting that if “we’re in a saxophone battle, I still have to play my best”).
222. See Robert Palmer, Concert: Sonny Rollins Meets Wynton Marsalis, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 1983)
https://www.nytimes.com/1983/06/05/arts/concert-sonny-rollins-meets-wynton-marsalis.html
[https://perma.cc/5K7H-575G] (recounting their musical exchanges); BERLINER, supra note 1, at 374–75 (discussing challenges of playing with Rollins).
223. KAHN, supra note 74, at 35, 49–51.
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Framing Jazz Improvisation Schematically

These multi-layered elements and constraints of jazz improvisation can be
presented schematically. The crucial time and sequence elements do not quite fit
in this simplified schematic, but each element identified below is wielded over
the sequential time unfolding of a musical performance.
The multilayered simultaneous elements shaping jazz improvisation, each
subject to choices and changes over time
Musicians with different instruments, skills, experience, tastes, musical voices, and goals
Genre and style
Melody/the song
Chords
Chord substitutions
Voicings
Density of chordal accompaniment (both notes and over the musical
sequence)
Variations and dissonance (for ex., fourth-based chords, additions of
ninth, flatted ninth, flatted fifth, blues notes)
Scales per chord (with variations and dissonance meshing or creating
tension with chord enrichments)
Modal scales (over chord sequences)
Note patterns, motifs, phrases, and contours
Chord sequence (over span of piece/melody)
Tempo
Rhythmic feel and pulse
Note placements within each beat
Density to sparseness of playing (both individual and collective)
Aligning, responding to, or contrasting with others in ensemble; the
“conversation”
Constructing musical arcs and structures;
Thus, in jazz improvisation, pervasive choice exists within a constraining
series of rules and practices. Sequential choices of many shape yet more choices
available to each other, at all moments creating a collective musical performance.
Facility and appropriate use of these practices and rules, in light of others’
choices, together determine the good and bad, and in more structured forms of
jazz, the right and the wrong, and especially provide criteria for comparative assessments of excellence.
The doing and development of law, as explained below, is similarly rife
with this balance of choices, constraining rules, and options shaped over time by
the work of many interacting people and institutions.
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IV. LAW AS JAZZ: COLLECTIVE, STRATEGIC AND CONSTRAINED CHOICES IN
THE DYNAMIC LEGAL SYSTEM
The Article now analyzes ways law shares attributes with the art of jazz
improvisation, especially due to their common interactive, sequential, and dynamic attributes in settings characterized by constraining but changing rules and
practices. Much as merely listening to a jazz improvisation tells you little, merely
reading a single legal decision, statutory section or regulation tends to reveal little about what generated the actions or, more importantly, what they mean, can
mean, or will become through legal stakeholders’ strategic choices. Little in law
comes close to mere obedience to clear commands or mere interpretation.
A.

A Note Regarding the Law Versus “Doing Law” Distinction

But is this Article erring in mixing “law” and the “doing of law”? This Part
is designed in large part to address this question. The basic answer is that all law
is really the doing of law. Or, to put it differently, law operates through choices
about how the law is written, interpreted, implemented, enforced, complied with,
and changed; that human intervention involves both doing law and making law
manifest in ever-changing forms.224 No actor or institution ever issues or takes a
legal action that is a final endpoint.225 All legal actions, whether advocacy or a
decider’s declaration of law, are launched into a world where they will be strategically used, contested, extended, changed, trumped or sidestepped by others. In
the words of Charles Fried, legal doctrine is “somewhere between story and argument.”226
For example, a judicial decision is, of course, a quintessential form of law.
It may resolve a particular controversy at that moment, yet it also acts as a precedent that shapes what future contentions will be strong or weak.227 Litigants and
later courts will battle over its applicability and implications, with change or later
outright overruling possible.228 The same is true for regulatory and legislative
disputants, for legislation, and even for constitutional texts.229 Rarely are any
legal materials static or an utterly clear command. Diverse methodologies will
be wielded, with layers and crosscurrents of relevant law, chosen levels of generality, and application puzzles further complicating the effort to discern or predict “the law.”
It is possible that frequent claims about law’s static or stable nature, or the
exclusive legitimacy of one method or choice, are more political or rhetorical
gambits than genuinely believed. Duncan Kennedy was perhaps driving at a similar point in stating legal actors may feel the need to “put their demands into
224. See generally Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (1997).
225. See Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1140, 1152 (1994) (explaining that
“[legal] [d]octrine must persist in order to constrain”).
226. Id. at 1144–45, 1150–52 (exploring doctrine’s emergence over time).
227. See id. at 1140–42 (discussing precedent).
228. See id.
229. See id.
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rights language” because of the view that “rights rhetoric ‘works.’”230 Claims
that space for legal discretion will make law all politics may similarly be strategic
ploys, counterarguments, or rhetorical gambits.231 Perhaps few actually see the
law as necessarily coming out on one side of the “unhelpful . . . ancient question
whether judges find or invent law,” as Dworkin says in his exploration of “integrity in law.”232
On the other hand, if the nation’s Supreme Court Chief Justice really sees
law, or perhaps his judicial role, as about “balls and strikes,” then critiquing such
a claim remains important.233 Indeed, such claims that law is about obedience,
mandates, and certainty of method are so prevalent that this Article takes them
seriously.234 In addition, questions about “the best” or optimal place for law on
the continuum between stability, context-sensitive adjustment, and dynamism
remain a legitimate inquiry.235
As explained and illustrated below, law pervasively involves strategic, constrained choosing in sequentially developing settings. Law rarely commands just
one thing, but it does channel, coerce, grant entitlements and presumptions, and
organize behavior.236 Choices and outcomes are reached, and sometimes a legal
answer is clear, but rarely does mere reference to some governing text or analytical method irrefutably establish what must be.237 This Part’s discussion illustrates how and why law is characterized by such sequential, strategic, constrained
choosing.

230. Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE
178, 213–14, 217 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
231. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1985).
232. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 41, at 225.
233. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing Roberts’ claim).
234. Justice Scalia insisted on the need for determinacy, stability, and checks on abuse, even if his form of
textualism is arguably highly indeterminate. Compare Scalia, supra note 231 (praising rules in law), with Abbe
Gluck, Textualism without Formalism: Justice Scalia’s Interpretation Legacy, in JUSTICE SCALIA: RHETORIC
AND THE RULE OF LAW 81, 81–85 (Brian G. Slocum & Francis J. Mootz III eds., 2019) (challenging idea that
textualism is a formalist method).
235. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L. J. 65, 65–66 (1983).
236. Professors Gluck and Schacter question new textualists’ claims of formalism and judicial self-restraint,
highlighting largely unordered interpretive move options. Gluck, supra note 234, at 85–86 (disputing claims that
new textualism is “formalist”); Jane S. Schacter, Text or Consequences, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (2011)
(noting textualist recourse to substantive and political preferences).
237. Justice Cardozo highlighted this mix of clear law, choice, and change. CARDOZO, supra note 17, at
129–30, 137 (stating that in “countless litigations” the law is so “clear that judges have no discretion,” but in “the
borderland, the penumbra, where controversy begins” a judge must “[i]nnovate”).
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Legal Tools, Institutions, and Modes Creating Choice and Dynamism

As prelude to case-study illustration of the law-jazz improvisation similarities, a short and highly simplified presentation of law’s multilayered elements
is offered here, as it was at the end of Part III for jazz improvisation. This simplified schematic form will help frame analysis of how law and ensemble jazz
improvisation share practice and structural similarities. As with music, law is
revealed and contested over time; that time element is assumed in all of the elements now highlighted.
The multilayered elements, modes, and choices shaping the law
Jurisdictions (federal, state, local)
Institutions generating legal materials (constitutional conventions, legislatures, agencies, courts)
Diverse human actors with diverse interests (for ex., political counsel,
corporate counsel, plaintiffs’ and defendants’ lawyers, non-lawyer clients utilizing the legal system)
Diverse institutions affected by or seeking to shape legal outcomes (for
ex., markets, corporations, not-for-profits, communities sharing interests, arms of government (and innumerable others))
Modes (or forms) of law and legal action (for ex., drafting constitutions, legislating, promulgating regulations, issuing legal guidance, advising, permitting, licensing, enforcing, litigating, negotiating, contracting, determining judicial review access, judicial deciding)
Fields of law applicable (for ex., constitutional law, common law bodies (tort, property, contract) administrative law, areas of substantive
law (for ex., environmental law, tax law), federal courts, federalism
doctrine, criminal or civil procedure, intellectual property law, statutory interpretation method)
Historical contexts of legal matter and materials
Varied factual, technological, societal, economic, and science contexts
Hierarchical power claims about institutions, legal forms, and legal
fields pertaining to a dispute or choice
Choices of venues for legal contestation
Choices of sequence with venues
Text selection (word, operative text word cluster, context, structure,
signals about a law’s functions and purposes, recourse to other laws’
similar texts and overlapping turfs)
Precedents (claims about governing or similar cases, statutes, regulatory actions, or historical traditions)
Ascertainment of precedents’ power
Methodologies for interpreting or arguing
Purposes and goals of legal materials
Consequences of choices
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Implications of each other’s choices238
As discussed in this Part, most legal work arises in settings where no one
controls higher level “meta” choices of which jurisdictions, legal actors, legal
materials, modes, methods, sequences, or venues should govern. Other players
and their interests may initially be unknowable.
C.

Law in Play Versus Law as Settled

To set the stage for subject-focused case studies illuminating jazz and law
similarities, the Article first focuses at a higher level on when legal work arises.
Legal edicts can at times be quite clear—for example, a state-set speed limit, or
controlled substance prohibition, or the age at which someone can become the
United States president—but new or clarifying law emerges when the preceding
state of the law leaves room for play, choice, and change. And because law involves a collective activity, with unpredictable actors, constrained choosing, and
outcomes revealed over time, it is structurally a great deal like jazz improvisation.239 If there is no choice to be made, there is often no work—legal or musical—to do. Hence, questions about legal methodologies and the nature of law
cannot assume away the main setting of legal work, namely where a legal choice
is subject to uncertainty and contestation.240
If the law is rigid and known, clients hiring lawyers would risk squandering
resources on futile legal change efforts.241 At times legal work can involve sorting out the maze of laws pertinent to a complex situation or financial puzzle, but
the facts or legal intricacy pose the main challenge. In these settings, characterizing the doing of law as akin to “cataloguing” or “archaeological” in nature
makes some sense.242 But that sort of work is far less common than non-lawyers
and often new law students expect.
Uncertainties and probabilistic analysis are prevalent because law guides,
acts on, or constrains actions under consideration. And with situational variation,
even a known single piece of applicable law may lead to uncertain results.243 Add
more layers of law, other institutions, and diverse stakeholder goals, and even
more predictive uncertainty follows.244 In addition, most forms of law are generated by multiple actors over a time sequence. In Professor Arthur Corbin’s
words, writing about case precedents regarding the presence or absence of a
238. See supra Part III.
239. Sheila Simon, Jazz and Family Law: Structures, Freedoms, and Sound Changes, 42 IND. L. REV. 567,
580 (2009).
240. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL
INTERPRETATION 3 (2006) (focusing on the implications of pervasive legal uncertainty and questions about institutional competence).
241. Frank Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & SOC.
PROBLEMS 61, 61 (1994).
242. See Fuller, supra note 61, at 662–68 (critiquing such views of the law); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 59–60 (1988) (criticizing the archaeological metaphor).
243. See CARDOZO, supra note 17, at 128–29.
244. Id.
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contract, “[b]eing drawn by many hands, there are gaps . . . and . . . conflicting
lines.”245 Probabilistic analysis will shape where legal work happens, influencing
investment choices in legal advocacy.246 As Judge Easterbrook observed, people
do not go to court with “clear cases. Why waste the time and money?”247 People
engage with law when there is “conflict” or “ambigui[ty]” or the world has
changed so old law does not fit.248 And where the stakes are high enough, need
for legal change may justify a long-shot effort.249
Legal work hence tends to happen where lawyers and other law creators
see room for discretionary judgments and legal adjustment; as a result, the law
moves or becomes more specifically delineated.250 Even in battles over a particular commercial practice and its legality, stakeholders will see different stakes,
wield different information and power, and seek to nudge the law or legal arrangements in their preferred direction.251 Much as contract law and the linked
art of negotiation involve asymmetrical information and different party stakes,
solutions and advantage through law will vary for different stakeholders.252 Factual complexities and interactively created circumstances, like musicians throwing each other unexpected choices, will create settings not resolved by earlier
legal materials.253
In addition, legal choosing and resulting dynamism often traces to the absence of any final legal venue and sequence uncertainties.254 This is pervasively
true, but especially so in the setting of high stakes regulatory battles involving
“the art of regulatory war.”255 In such settings, a multi-layered or grid-like

245. 1 Timothy Bender, Corbin on Contracts § 2.13 (2022).
246. For exploration of the claim that common law litigation moves policy towards allocative efficiency,
see D. Daniel Sokol, Rethinking the Efficiency of the Common Law, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 796–97 (2019)
(citing works by Richard Posner and others discussing the efficiency claim).
247. Easterbrook, supra note 241, at 61.
248. Id.
249. For example, in F.D.A. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), preceding governing administrative law doctrine and statutory language provided ample basis to uphold Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority to regulate tobacco. However, an imperiled tobacco industry fought anyway, ultimately winning and generating new legal exceptions to deference, new statutory interpretation moves, as well as
justices mbracing methods usually rejected. For a critique, see JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON,
LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 1191–96 (3d ed. 2017).
250. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Lawyers as Transaction Cost Engineers, NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECON. & L. 508, 509 (1998) (arguing how transactional legal work minimizes transactions costs).
251. See generally id.; see also Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, & Robert E. Scott, Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
170, 172 (2013) (arguing that parties and lawyers in contracts innovate and strive for efficiency, with courts only
later playing a limited role).
252. See William Samuelson, Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 995, 995–96
(1984) (exploring asymmetric information problems).
253. This is most notably the case in remaking of Commerce Clause doctrine and “waters” protections. See
discussion infra Subsection IV.D.2.
254. For example, presidents are little constrained choosing administration priorities. William W. Buzbee,
The Tethered President: Consistency and Contingency in Administrative Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1426–29
(2018) (discussing ways president is “tethered” in seeking agency policy change).
255. WILLIAM W. BUZBEE, FIGHTING WESTWAY: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, CITIZEN ACTIVISM, AND THE
REGULATORY WAR THAT TRANSFORMED NEW YORK CITY 31–51 (2014) (introducing elements of the “art of
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panoply of actors and institutions partake in battles akin to “blood sport.”256 Prediction of others’ choices is difficult to impossible.257 In addition, United States
federalism often leaves space for federal, state, and often local governments to
make different choices, a possibility stakeholders will utilize.258 Relatedly, legislative, presidential, and agency agenda setting and choices about programmatic
and enforcement priorities are rarely determined by any constraining legal
texts.259
And within federal, state, or local governments, legislators often empower
agencies to handle a social challenge.260 Agencies and stakeholders before them
also have both procedural and substantive discretion in making constrained
choices.261 Agencies choose procedural modes based on a complex assessment
of delay risks, benefits of momentum, power of the possible forms of regulation,
durability of the action, and how mode choices might trigger different levels of
judicial review.262
Whether a legal decider or counsel, lawyers will assess past related legal
actions since most forms of law respect precedent or disfavor unreasoned legal
change.263 Legal materials, especially statutes, often dictate certain methodologies and procedures, identify salient metrics and interests, and favor particular
policy outcomes.264 Legal actors will choose legal venues and frames that comport with their goals, trying to anticipate others’ similar strategic choices.265 Each
legal clarification, victory, or loss changes probabilities, elicits or produces information, and may shift legal norms, understandings, and stakeholders’
power.266 Even the most bureaucratic of legal institutions involve human
regulatory war” in book analyzing fourteen-year battle against a highway, development, and park project proposed for placement in the Hudson River).
256. See Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan
Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1680–81 (2012).
257. For exploration of sequence in shaping constitutional law, see Fried, supra note 225, at 1145–46 (exploring how law and other realms of logic, life, and art are “time-extended” and doctrine is “between story and
argument”).
258. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, supra note 35, at 1039; Carlson, supra note 37, at 1098–99.
259. See Buzbee, supra note 254, at 1427–29 (noting general lack of law governing prioritization of regulatory actions); see also Jody Freeman & Sharon Jacobs, Structural Deregulation, 135 HARV. L. REV. 585, 590
(2021) (analyzing executive power to cause structural deregulation with few checks).
260. See Freeman & Jacobs, supra note 259, at 656.
261. For the key doctrinal affirmation of agency procedural discretion, see S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194, 203 (1947); for exploration of agency forms (or modes) and their implications, see M. Elizabeth
Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1383–84 (2004).
262. See BUZBEE, supra at note 255, at 31–51 (introducing and explaining the concept of the “art of regulatory war”); see also Magill, supra note 261, at 1384 (identifying agency choices of forms of action and their
implications); Robert L. Glicksman & David L. Markell, Unraveling the Administrative State: Mechanism
Choice, Key Actors, and Regulatory Tools, 36 VA. ENV’T L.J. 318, 326 (2018) (discussing agency modal
choices).
263. See Buzbee, supra note 254, at 1424 (analyzing consistency doctrine and how law balances stability
and room for change).
264. BUZBEE, supra note 255, at 33–34, 220–22, 227–28 (analyzing Westway battles shaped by stakeholders seeking outcomes consistent with statutory priorities).
265. Such strategic, sequential, multi-layered regulatory battles are analyzed in id. at 31.
266. Cf. Andrei Marmor, How Law is Like Chess, 12 LEGAL THEORY 347, 359 (2006) (stating rules and
practices of chess “constitute the practice” but “do not exhaust it” and exploring how law works similarly).
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judgments shaped by diverse skills, experiences, and priorities, always leaving
predictive uncertainty.267
Thus, legal work and law declarations emerge from a matrix laden with
constrained choices and predictive uncertainties. If one looks at law only with
narrowed focus on a particular actor, a single issue, or the words of a particular
legal decision or isolated words in a statute, such framing omits the true forces
shaping past and future law.268 Such a narrow or blindered legal focus is akin to
looking at a single pixel of a photographic image or a musical note without surrounding context.269 Such a focus will often omit the very interactions, needs,
and incentives that drive legal disputes, uncertainties, changes, and also illuminate what happened and where the law is likely to go.270 How the law in diverse
areas is subject to such strategic choice, play, and change, even in areas claimed
to be governed by rigid law or clear mandates, is explored through the case studies that follow.
D.

Legal Case Studies Illuminating Law-Jazz Similarities

To illustrate this pervasive choosing and strategizing of law, illuminated
through the jazz improvisation analogy, this Section turns to case study examples. In the interest of brevity and due to past scholarship by this author and
others, it omits the most easily understood jazz-like realms of U.S. law, namely
common law dynamism and federalism-facilitated interactions. In both of those
settings, as introduced above, changing circumstances, judicial agency, and strategic uses of different legal venues lead to legal strategizing and change much
like the constrained collective choosing and dynamism of jazz improvisation.271
Instead, this Article explores law’s pervasive constrained, sequential
choosing and change by looking at four case studies in public law settings, all of
which include claims of mandate, determinacy, and clear answers. One focuses
on the constitutionalizing of standing and the 2021 TransUnion decision.272 The
second looks at battles over what waters are federally protected under the Clean
Water Act.273 Third, this Section looks at the statutory interpretation textualist
claim that a narrowed focus on selected text is more determinate and constraining
than more pluralist methods.274 Lastly, the Article provides an administrative law
example, looking at both consistent strains of deference doctrine but also how
this area keeps being remade, especially with the emergence and evolution of the
major questions doctrine.275
267. See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1293 (concluding human normative judgments in law are unavoidable);
Frank, supra note 46, at 1264 (same).
268. Frank, supra note 46, at 1262–64.
269. See id. at 1263–64.
270. See id.
271. For brief introduction to the common law dynamism literature, see notes 45–54 and accompanying
text; for a brief introduction to federalism, see notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
272. See discussion infra Subsection IV.D.1.
273. See discussion infra Subsection IV.D.2.
274. See discussion infra Subsection IV.D.3.
275. See discussion infra Subsection IV.D.4.
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In all of these examples, claims that particular legal outcomes or methods
are commanded or must be turn out, upon examination, to be barely justified,
contingent, and strategic.276 Within each case study, one finds clashes over where
space for choice exists.277 Legal methodology is wielded erratically, or perhaps
strategically, little constrained by concepts of precedent.278 All involve multiple
actors reshaping the law with jazz improvisation-like constrained, collective, sequential, and strategic choosing. And by expanding the analytical lens to see the
choosing and change, one finds far more criteria for assessing the legal action’s
integrity and logic than a more singular, snapshot focus.
1.

The Constitutionalizing and Reshaping of Standing Doctrine

The Article now turns to standing doctrine, focusing on past Justice Antonin Scalia’s key Supreme Court standing opinions and significant standing doctrine shifts in the 2021 TransUnion decision.279 Modern standing doctrine continues to be constructed from disparate strains of law, with varying degrees of fit
and change readily open to identification and critique.280 This body of standing
law is nothing like classical music interpretive choices, but is much like jazz
improvisation, but of an unconvincing sort. Key opinions select from sometimes
misfitting and disparate cases, legal authority, and a mix of logic and illogic to
weave judge-empowering barriers to court access while undoing congressional
policy choices.281
At its most basic, standing doctrine as currently understood shapes who is
allowed to stand and be heard before a court.282 The exact borders and distinctions between standing’s constitutional, prudential, and statutory elements have
long been murky.283 The constitutional prong builds mainly on the United States
Constitution’s Article III “Cases” or “Controversies” language.284 The statutory
wrinkle concerns the power of Congress to influence standing: how do a statute’s

276. See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1278, 1285, 1303 (analyzing concepts of legal “meaning”).
277. For an embrace of dynamic views of law, focused on what judges do and should do in interpreting
statutes, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 5–6 (1994). For criticisms, see John
Copeland Nagle, Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory Interpreter, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2209, 2239 (1995) (questioning updating laws without actual full process of legislating); SCALIA, supra note 224, at 22 (criticizing
Eskridge and arguing “[i]t is simply not compatible with democratic theory that laws mean what they ought to
mean, and that unelected judges decide what that is.”).
278. See generally, MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 249, at 75–77 (discussing methodological variety
and stare decisis); Evan J. Criddle & Glenn Staszewski, Against Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 GEO. L. J.
1573, 157576 (2014); Gluck, supra note 234, at 81–85 (focusing on textualism’s many unordered choices).
279. See TransUnion L.L.C. v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2215 (2021).
280. See William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 247, 249
(2001).
281. See id. at 248–49.
282. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (stating the basic rationales for limiting standing).
283. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at 248 (exploring how statutes influence standing after Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)).
284. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Buzbee, supra note 280, at 258.
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requirements, protections, and causes of action influence judicial determinations
of who constitutionally can be heard in court?
Much of standing doctrine prior to Scalia’s influence involved direct claims
of constitutional harms where Congress had indicated nothing about who could
be heard in court.285 A substantial body of law also parsed who could bring suit
under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) cause of action, especially
over who was adequately “adversely affected or aggrieved”—the key APA
terms—such that they could complain about an agency action.286
Before 1992, no case had ever found a constitutional standing problem if a
person brought suit under a particular statute for a particular kind of harm, where
Congress had specifically created a cause of action.287 Earlier decisions and
scholarship assumed or argued that such statutorily conferred claims would both
create a case and eliminate (or perhaps satisfy) constitutional standing barriers.288
This last kind of setting—generally referred to as involving citizen suit provisions—involves Congress creating a “case” in the sense of a cause of action.289
Likewise, the APA cause of action against the government, as well as “private
attorney general” causes of action authorizing private suits against private actors
for statutory violations, both clearly authorize “cases.”290 In addition, since the
pre-Founding era, private litigants could bring suits for qui tam monetary recoveries when protecting the public’s resources from wrongdoing.291
Under Justice Scalia’s leadership, the Court strengthened standing doctrine
as a constitutional barrier to citizen court access. 292 He notably claimed that constitutional standing requirements, even as he actually recast them, were “essential

285. See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing after Lujan—Of Citizen Suits, Injuries, and Article III, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 163, 182–92 (1992) (discussing history of standing prior to Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992)); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754–55 (1984) (holding no adequate standing injury simply for
government violating the law); City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983) (requiring injury to be actual
or imminent).
286. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702.
287. See Richard J. Pierce, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1178–70 (1993).
288. For cases, see, e.g., Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942) (noting that under statute,
“private litigants have standing only as representatives of the public interest”); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476–77 (1940) (finding standing under statute even though not given a legally protected
interest under it); Scenic Hudson Pres. Conf. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 615 (2d Cir. 1965) (noting
that “a statute may create new interests or rights and thus give standing to one who would otherwise be barred”).
For scholarship, see generally Sunstein, supra note 285; William W. Buzbee, The Story of Laidlaw: Standing
and Citizen Enforcement, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 201, 201 (Oliver A. Houck & Richard J. Lazarus eds.,
2005); see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222–23 (1988); Louis L. Jaffe,
Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033,
1035–36 (1968).
289. Judge Fletcher argued that this should be the defining test for standing. See Fletcher, supra note 288,
at 223–24.
290. See id.
291. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 773–78 (2000) (reviewing the history of
qui tam litigation and federal statutes long authorizing such litigation).
292. See Buzbee, supra note 288, at 205.
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and unchanging.”293 In reality, the legal shifts Scalia steered into Supreme Court
law were not constitutionally inevitable, not dictated by case precedents, and not
rooted in determinate constitutional language.294 In his selective picking and
choosing from a web of legal materials, plus resulting change and subsequent
instability, this body of law manifests attributes much like jazz improvisation,
although perhaps of questionable quality due to failures to concede, explain, and
justify what actually were creative moves.
The key constitutionalizing doctrinal shift was made in a mostly majority
Scalia opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (“Lujan”).295 Citing Articles II
and III of the Constitution, the Court stated beneficiaries of regulation face
heightened barriers to the courts, while those subject to regulation—so-called
regulatory targets—usually have easier court access because of the direct, palpable, common law-like nature of their interests impinged upon by regulation.296
The Court made clear that claims involving real property, monetary, or tort-like
injuries and threatened injuries will generally suffice for standing.297 The Endangered Species Act’s express cause of action authorizing citizens to check private
or government illegality did not alone constitutionally suffice for standing.298
This standing doctrine shift involved selective choosing, ignoring, and reshaping of several bodies of law. First, Lujan substantially relied on Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation, a case that involved language about litigant access
to the courts when dealing with heavily political agency choices.299 That case,
however, was about the APA’s judicial review provisions and cause of action,
not a constitutional standing case.300 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, however,
substantially lifted this APA-rooted discussion and made it constitutionally required under Article III of the Constitution.301 Like Sonny Rollins integrating
another song’s melody into an improvised solo, this precedent language was unmoored from its APA roots to supply a new constitutional test.302
Second, a line of earlier standing cases dealt with direct claims under the
Constitution and constitutional standing concerns, but lacked the issue of possible judicial standing barriers contrary to congressional design.303 Despite this
separation of powers wrinkle and legislative policymaking primacy, the Lujan
293. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992) (also quoted in Vt Agency of Nat. Res., 529
U.S. at 771); see also Honorable Patricia M. Wald, The Cinematic Supreme Court: 1991-92 Term, 7 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 238, 239 (1993) (“There is no way that the origin of the increasingly tough three-pronged standing test—
injury, causation, redressability—can be traced to the stark constitutional phrase ‘case or controversy.’”).
294. See e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. 555.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 562.
297. Id. at 561.
298. Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
299. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 871 (1990).
300. Id. at 882–83.
301. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–78 (1992).
302. Sunstein, supra note 285, at 181–86, 222–23 (discussing transition of APA language into constitutional
doctrine).
303. Lujan, for example, was rooted in a citizen suit provision integrated into the Endangered Species Act,
not a cause of action, like that under the APA or Section 1983, applicable to a massive number of government
actions. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 557–58 (1992).
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Court nonetheless said “there is absolutely no basis for making the Article III
inquiry turn on the source of the asserted right”; it made no difference that Congress had conferred a cause of action.304
Third, the view that Article II was relevant to standing had been mentioned
in Allen v. Wright but was given newfound prominence in Lujan; it newly viewed
citizen suit authorization as running afoul of, or at least requiring judicial trimming, due to Article II’s obligation that the president “Take Care” to enforce the
law.305
Fourth, what little the Supreme Court had previously said on this issue of
congressional power to confer a cause of action and constitutional standing was
contrary to this Lujan conclusion. In Sierra Club v. Morton and International
Primate Protection League, the Court indicated that that setting—congressional
explicit conferral of a cause of action—would be different since, with an explicitly conferred cause of action, litigants would have a “case.”306
Lujan thus made major new constitutional law: even if a litigant satisfied
the elements of a congressionally conferred cause of action, the Court newly gave
judges a constitutional veto-gate in the form of standing doctrine.307 When the
Court stated there was “no basis” to adjust standing conclusions due to Congress
creating a cause of action, this was a conclusory new law declaration, not an
assertion grounded in or compelled by earlier legal materials.308
Lujan’s own precedential power was left uncertain due to gaps in reasoning, concurring opinions, Court fragmentation, and especially due to its newly
created category of “procedural rights” standing.309 An across-the-board constitutional requirement of palpable common law-like injury was hard to reconcile
with hundreds of cases brought under the APA for National Environmental Policy Act310 violations, or for violations of the Freedom of Information Act,311
where informational interests are at stake. Similarly, other government APA violations had for sixty years been litigated by citizens despite remands where ultimate outcomes are unknown.312 To address these concerns and likely maintain
a majority, the Lujan court created a new category of “procedural” injuries that
were the subject of their own more forgiving constitutional standing frame.313 As
304. Id. at 576–77.
305. 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) (declining standing in case characterized as not involving “direct harm” but
seeking “a restructuring of the . . . Executive Branch” with its “duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed’”); Sunstein, supra note 285, at 194–95 (discussing the Article II analysis in Lujan).
306. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972) (“Where the party does not rely on any
specific statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process, the question of standing depends upon whether the
party has alleged such a ‘personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’”) (emphasis added); Int’l Primate
Prot. League v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 77 (1991) (“[S]tanding is gauged by the specific
common-law, statutory or constitutional claims that a party presents”) (emphasis added).
307. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555–56.
308. See id. at 576.
309. See id. at 571–78 (discussing procedural injury claims).
310. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
311. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.
312. See, e.g., cases regarding the EPA, such as Gen. Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530 (1990).
313. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571–78.

BUZBEE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

140

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

11/28/22 5:02 PM

[Vol. 2023

long as underlying interests were sufficiently real and potentially affected,
Lujan’s language seemed to indicate, litigation seeking compliance with statutory requirements and procedures would suffice.314
Further confusing the power of Lujan, Justices Kennedy and Souter—
whose votes were needed to make a Court majority—rejected key Scalia language.315 In Kennedy’s opinion, he (aligned with Souter and dissenters on this
point) said Congress had the power to “define injuries” and “articulate chains of
causation” even if lacking common law analogues.316 All of this splintering,
change, and omitted explication left considerable doctrinal uncertainty.
Subsequent cases such as Akins, Laidlaw, and Massachusetts v. EPA cut
back on Lujan.317 Clear majorities agreed that congressional choices and priorities influence standing analysis, although the judicial veto-gate role remained.318
Clear majorities in Massachusetts and the more recent Spokeo case embraced the
Kennedy Lujan view that Congress can define what count as protected interests
and “articulate chains of causation” that shape what suffices for standing.319
Spokeo’s majority also, however, murkily stated both that congressional judgments about interests and injuries are “instructive,” and also that “Article III
standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”320
The 2021 TransUnion decision again wrenched standing doctrine in a new
direction.321 Its effects, however, are likewise uncertain due to questionable logic
and precedent omissions in the majority opinion by Justice Brett Kavanaugh.322
Like Spokeo, the case concerned standing and relief for violations of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act under an express cause of action.323 The plaintiffs alleged
violations directly affecting them, among them defendants’ dissemination of reports erroneously identifying plaintiffs as terrorists or drug dealers, plus false
and incomplete defendant reports sent to plaintiffs.324
Thus, TransUnion seemingly checked all of the key precedent boxes for
standing: Congress had protected consumers’ interest in accurate credit report
information, had set statutory requirements that defendants had violated, had created a private cause of action that even provided for actual and statutory

314. Id. (discussing procedural injury standing).
315. Id. at 579–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
316. Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
317. See generally Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Env’t Servs., Inc. 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
318. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 29; Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 201; Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517.
319. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016). For further discussion, see Bradford C. Mank,
Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing
Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701, 1725–26 (2008) (discussing standing analysis in Massachusetts
v. EPA); Buzbee, supra note 280, at 279 (tracing Kennedy’s concurrence into clear majority view); Bradford C.
Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENV’T L. 1, 63–64 (2005) (analyzing
Akins and Kennedy’s Lujan opinion).
320. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341.
321. See generally TransUnion L.L.C. v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021).
322. See generally id.
323. Id. at 2200.
324. Id. at 2200–02.
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monetary damages (a form of harm and relief Lujan privileged, as did qui tam
precedents), and all of the plaintiffs could show that their own statutorily protected rights had been violated.325 They were not seeking government compliance with the law, action just in the public’s interest, or tracing harms and redress
through an uncertain sequence of third parties.326 They were directly suing the
law violators and seeking monetary relief.327
Nonetheless, TransUnion rejected the congressional design and denied
standing to thousands of plaintiffs who had directly experienced regulatory violations.328 Finding that only “republication” to third parties of defamatory information sufficed for standing, the Court only selectively engaged its own precedents.329 Instead, it cited Spokeo and mainly leapt back to Scalia language in
Lujan, but with even greater emphasis on standing barriers as shaped by “physical, monetary, or cognizable intangible harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.”330 The Court repeatedly alludes to
“history” and “tradition” and especially “traditional harms” as shaping and limiting standing.331 It looks for a “close historical or common law analogue” for
harms resulting from statutory violations for plaintiffs to have standing.332
While the Court never says it is extending or changing standing doctrine,
or overruling key standing precedents, at several crucial points it can find no
Supreme Court precedents.333 And Sierra Club v. Morton, or Laidlaw, or Akins,
or Massachusetts? The Kennedy and Souter Lujan language embraced by majorities in Massachusetts and Spokeo? None are even cited, let alone discussed.334
Environmental hypotheticals are offered to illuminate the lack of standing, but
without citation or working with language from major environmental standing
cases finding “environmental and aesthetic” interests enough.335
Justices Thomas and Kagan, in separate opinions joined by other dissenters,
lambaste the majority for ignoring precedents, getting standing history wrong,
and for denying Congress power to give citizens the right to sue for violations
directly affecting them.336 In Justice Thomas’s words, the Constitution requires
“no such thing.”337 “Never before . . . has [the] Court declared that legislatures
are constitutionally precluded from creating legal rights enforceable in federal
court if those rights deviate too far from their common-law roots,” he observes.338 Justice Kagan, also writing for four justices in dissent, says that the
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

See id.
Such attenuated causation claims influenced the Lujan standing rejection.
TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2200–02.
Id. at 2200, 2209–13.
Id.
Id. at 2204–07.
Id. 2204.
Id.
Id. at 2203, 2205 (citing a law review article by Justice Scalia and Seventh and Eleventh Circuit cases).
See id.
See id. at 2206 n.2, 2207 n.3.
Id. at 2214 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2225 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2214 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2221 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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TransUnion majority “transforms standing law from a doctrine of judicial modesty into a tool of judicial aggrandizement.”339
Hence, in this constitutional standing setting claimed to be “essential and
unchanging” in Lujan, and merely following “tradition” in TransUnion, virtually
nothing fits those claims.340 Standing doctrine appears increasingly dependent on
the setting of the standing dispute.341 Neither Lujan nor TransUnion concede
they are refashioning the law.342 Their claims of obedience to constitutional requirements, precedents, and tradition lack support.343 Material from other settings is imported and refashioned.344 Some might applaud how litigation over
regulatory violations is now curtailed, but as Justice Thomas establishes in his
lengthy, blistering TransUnion dissent, the Court’s creation of newfound barriers
to standing is “remarkable in both its novelty and effects.”345 This body of law
shows moves like jazz improvisation in its selective use of constraining authority, but, due to illogic and omissions, is akin to an unskilled and unconvincing
performance that fails to engage key constraining materials.
2.

What Are Federal Waters?

This Article now turns to a statutory question from a few unchanged words
in the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) since 1972: what are the “waters of the United
States” (“WOTUS”) subject to federal jurisdiction?346 Lawyers, agencies, and
justices have taken a seemingly settled issue and for several decades used strategic moves to remake the law, again and again.347 Far from mere interpretation or
law resulting from the commands of words, several new legal gambits have
emerged from and changed this body of law, with multiple legal institutions and
regulatory modalities in play.348 Once again, law is done and emerges from constrained choices that are sequentially and strategically made by multiple actors
in response to each other.349 It is not just about command, or like interpretation
of fully written classical music. Nonetheless, shifts in this law are readily understandable and subject to critical analysis once one expects law to develop in ways
akin to jazz improvisation and assesses the legal shifts in light of constraining
legal materials. Despite these shifts, key parts of this changing law include claims
that certain outcomes are commanded and clear, but analysis reveals that they
339. Id. at 2225 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
340. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2204.
341. See generally Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061 (2015).
342. See generally Lujan, 504 U.S.; TransUnion, 141 S. Ct.
343. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 574–78; TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2209–13.
344. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2219–25 (Thomas J., dissenting) (tracing standing’s history and “graft[ing]”
of concepts from other settings).
345. Id. at 2221 (Thomas J. dissenting). Justice Thomas distinguishes private enforcement of “public
rights,” where he thinks standing can be limited, and “private rights” settings where plaintiffs directly experience
regulatory violations and Congress conferred on them a cause of action. Id. at 2219–21.
346. Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
347. See infra text accompanying notes 360–94.
348. See infra text accompanying notes 371–74 (noting the opposing arguments towards prior settled interpretation of water laws by federal courts).
349. See supra note 224 and accompany text.
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are actually choices, and sometimes unpersuasive choices as a matter of law or
legal craft.
The CWA extends federal jurisdiction to regulate water pollution to “navigable waters,” which in turn are defined as “the waters of the United States.”350
The “navigable waters” language was plucked from the Rivers and Harbors Act
(“RHA”)351, much like a jazz improviser will quote other tunes or integrate past
phrases into a new performance.352 The reach of federal power under this provision has undergone significant reshaping through legislative, agency, litigant,
and judicial actions since passage of the RHA and the CWA.353
The RHA mainly regulated waterways obstructions, but also regulated water pollution.354 In early enforcement actions and regulatory interpretations, the
Army Corps of Engineers interpreted the Section 13 “navigable waters” language
to limit their regulatory power to materials specifically impeding navigation.355
By around 1970, as pollution concerns intensified, more expansive views of the
RHA’s protections were asserted by anti-pollution enforcers and, eventually, the
Army Corps itself.356 The statutory definition of “navigable waters” included in
the CWA—”the waters of the United States”—went even further.357 Discussions
about this 1972 amendment state a desire to provide broader regulatory power
than in the RHA.358 An early narrow Army Corps interpretation of this waters
language was judicially rejected.359
Subsequently, due to this broad CWA definitional language and supportive
legislative history, as well as case law both about federal Commerce Clause
power in the post-New Deal years and waters jurisdiction, a period of stability
followed.360 For roughly the next thirty years, all government actors, including
both Democratic and Republican administrations, embraced the view that this
language extended federal jurisdiction to protect waters as far as the Commerce
350. Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1), 1362(7), 1362(12) (stating it “is the goal that discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters by eliminated by 1985,” defining “navigable waters,” and defining
regulated “discharge of a pollutant” as meaning “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters”).
351. Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 400–41. See William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States—State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part II, 22 STAN. ENV’T L.J.
215, 220–21, 258–59, 293–94 (2003) (tracing the definition of “navigable waters” from the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899 to the Clean Water Act of 1977).
352. See supra Subsection III.C.4.
353. See infra text accompanying notes 354–414.
354. See 33 U.S.C. § 407; Andreen, supra note 351, at 220–21 (discussing the provision regulating pollutants within the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899); see generally William W. Sapp, Tracy L. Starr & M. Allison
Burdette, From the Fields of Runnymede to the Waters of the United States: A Historical Review of the Clean
Water Act and the Term “Navigable Waters,” 36 ENV’T L. REP.: NEWS & ANALYSIS 10190 (2006) (recounting
“navigable waters” developments).
355. Andreen, supra note 351, at 221–22.
356. Id. at 258–59.
357. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 407 (regulating “navigable waters,” but not providing a definition of the term),
with 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (defining “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas”).
358. Andreen, supra note 351, at 280–81.
359. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975) (rejecting “waters”
regulations promulgated by the Army Corps of Engineers as too narrow in scope).
360. See infra text accompanying notes 361–62.
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Clause would allow.361 Promulgated regulations fleshed out particular types of
waters subject to federal protection, including a sweep-up provision protecting
waters used for, subject to use for, or affecting, interstate commerce.362
The Rehnquist Court’s federalism revival, however, created toeholds for
unsettling this bipartisan political consensus over waters protection.363 United
States v. Lopez was the first key salvo that shifted the law’s path, upholding a
challenge to federal Commerce Clause power to regulate guns near schools.364
Attacks on expansive federal environmental laws suddenly had new artillery and
provided a double opportunity.365 First, the laws might be weakened or shrunken
through constitutionally weighted “clear statement” arguments366, or, second,
such efforts to challenge the reach of environmental laws might, in the process,
expand upon these new limitations on federal commerce power.367 Basically, the
constitutional shifts wrought by Lopez and later Morrison created opportunities
for shrinking both federal statutory and constitutional power.368
When the Army Corps of Engineers asserted jurisdiction over abandoned
Midwestern water-filled gravel pits slated for municipal landfilling, it included
in its rationale that migratory birds used the pits.369 An earlier Federal Register
explanatory document—nonetheless dubbed the “Migratory Bird Rule”—had
identified this potential ground for federal jurisdiction.370 Opponents sought to
revive the word “navigable” as a rationale to deny federal jurisdiction.371 This
was a longshot argument. After all, the term was defined with the broad “waters
of the United States” language.372 In addition, the Supreme Court and lower
courts had long said the definition of “navigable waters” provided jurisdiction

361. For discussion of this expansive intent, see Erin Ryan, Federalism, Regulatory Architecture, and the
Clean Water Rule: Seeking Consensus on the Waters of the United States, ENV’T L. 277, 285–94 (2016); William
W. Sapp, Rebekah A. Robinson, & M. Allison Burdette, The Float A Boat Test: How to Use It to Advantage in
This Post-Rapanos World, 38 ENV’T L. REP.: NEWS & ANALYSIS 10439, 10442 (2008); Sapp et al., supra note
354, at 10201–06.
362. Definition of Navigable Waters of the United States, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,250 (Nov. 13, 1986)
(finalizing rule regulating wetlands, those adjacent to other waters, all interstate waters, and all intrastate waters
the “use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce”).
363. See infra notes 365–68 and accompanying text.
364. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
365. See Brief for Petitioner at 36–45, Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC),
531 U.S. 159 (2001) (No. 99–1178), (relying on Lopez to argue the Corps definition of “navigable waters” is
beyond the scope the Commerce Clause affords).
366. See id. at 15–21.
367. See id. at 36–45.
368. See generally Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
369. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162, 164–65; Brief for the Federal Respondents at 7–8, SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159
(No. 99–1178).
370. Definition of Navigable Waters of the United States, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,216–17 (Nov. 13, 1986).
371. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 365, at 16–19.
372. Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 369, at 7–8; see also United States v. Holland, 373 F.
Supp. 665, 670–76 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (holding that “Congress had the power to go beyond the ‘navigability’
limitation in its control over water pollution and that it intended to do so”); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding that Congress had “asserted federal jurisdiction over the
nation’s waters to the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution” and “the
term [‘navigable waters’] is not limited to the traditional tests of navigability”).
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broader than a navigability focus on use by large-scale ships and the like.373
Lastly, the Supreme Court in Riverside Bayview Homes in 1985 had unanimously
agreed that delegated, expert, science-intensive regulatory judgments about the
appropriate line between land and water were worthy of deference.374
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (“SWANCC”), however,
the Supreme Court embraced these new power-shrinking arguments and unsettled waters law.375 The Court revived “navigable” as power-limiting language.376
Drawing on the Court’s own federalism revival, the Court stated the Army Corps
was acting at the outer bounds of federal authority, but without a congressional
clear statement authorizing the power assertion.377 The Court also saw the jurisdictional assertion as a problematic incursion on states’ usual land use regulation
primacy, plus drew on a statutory savings clause, but otherwise left its constitutional concern unexplained.378
This claim that the action was at the boundaries of federal power was crucial to SWANCC379, but a puzzler. The water-filled pits were created by past
commercial use, migratory birds’ cross-state movements and linked commerce
had long been a basis for federal jurisdiction, and the site’s proposed new municipal landfilling was rife with direct commerce links and commerce effects.380
All anti-pollution laws overlap with state and local land use and pollution regulation, but no previous cases identified this as a constitutional problem.381 Still,
the Court waved at this claimed concern, then cited the constitutional avoidance
canon as a rationale to narrow the statute’s regulatory reach.382
The SWANCC court’s use of a “clear statement” plus federalism move also
created a powerful new precedent for challengers to cite, partly due to its unspecified application.383 If these vaguely explained concerns were enough, then
SWANCC could be artillery to challenge federal power without requiring clear
explication of the constitutional problem; turf overlap might suffice.384 The
373. See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 486 n.6 (1987); United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985); Callaway, 392 F. Supp. at 686.
374. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 134 (emphasizing the science and pragmatic expert judgment
involved in drawing the line on the continuum between land and water).
375. Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 171–72 (2001).
376. Id. at 172–73.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 174.
379. Id.
380. Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power and Perspective in
Commerce Clause Adjudication, CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1227 (2003) (questioning Court assertion of agency
action at the bounds of federal power).
381. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 138–39 (1985) (discussing
how Congress amended the CWA to address conflicting provisions and jurisdiction with potential state provisions and exercises of jurisdiction).
382. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
383. See Matthew B. Baumgartner, SWANCC’s Clear Statement: A Delimitation of Congress’s Commerce
Clause Authority to Regulate Water Pollution, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2137, 2148–49 (2005); see generally William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992) (discussing the usage of clear statement rules pre-SWANCC).
384. See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 443–44
(2010) (criticizing uses of “clear statement” moves if not linked to constitutional choices reflected in its text).
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Court (and litigants) could claim a sort of jurisprudential modesty, yet rewrite
law and jettison precedents: Congress simply had not conferred authority with
adequate clarity.385
Much as a new musical conception (like bebop chord-focused improvisation, or modal conceptions, or the discovery of the “flatted fifth”) opens new
musical improvisatory opportunities, these interwoven strategies seized in
SWANCC both reflected change and created powerful legal shifts due to their
combination of breadth and indeterminacy.
In the Rapanos litigation, another case about the reach of the CWA, these
opportunities were further exploited and fiercely contested.386 Challengers saw
Rapanos as a vehicle to extend Lopez, Morrison, SWANCC, and “clear statement” claims as well, possibly weakening the CWA and federal power more
broadly.387 If victorious, more waterside land could be developed and pollution
discharged with impunity.388 Opponents also sought to weaken the usual judicial
deference to agency law interpretations under the Chevron case.389
But much as jazz improvisation involves sequential and responsive interactions, supporters of waters protection raised counterarguments and wielded
different frames and methodologies.390 Pro-environmental interests and dozens
of states emphasized the stable, bipartisan nature of CWA waters protections.391
They argued Riverside Bayview Homes largely ruled as a precedent.392 Defenders
highlighted strong commerce linkages.393 Even the Bush administration—a generally antiregulatory administration—called for retention of longstanding views
of federal CWA power.394
The result was a splintered 4-1-4 mess, but with the different opinions addressing the array of statutory, constitutional, and precedent-based claims.395 Justice Scalia, speaking only for a plurality in his opinion’s limiting language, drew
on his “new textualism” toolchest.396 He mostly ignored legislative history, then
dismissed decades of administration and court views about waters authority as

385. See also discussion infra Subsection IV.D.4 (discussing deference regimes and major questions doctrine’s link to clear statement moves).
386. There were 65 briefs and amici filed in the Rapanos legislation. For discussion, see Felicity Barringer,
Reach of Clean Water Act Is at Issue in 2 Supreme Court Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/20/politics/reach-of-clean-water-act-is-at-issue-in-2-supreme-court-cases.html
[https://perma.cc/XX3W-QKK5].
387. Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 12–17, Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (No. 04–1034).
388. Cf. Brief for the National Association of Home Builders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
5–6, Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715 (No. 04–1034).
389. See Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 387, at 4–6; Brief of The Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 17–19, Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715 (No. 04–1034).
390. See infra text accompanying notes 391–94.
391. See Brief of Former EPA Administrators Carol M. Browner, William K. Reilly, Douglas M. Costle, &
Russell E. Train as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4–7, 26–21, Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715 (No. 04–1034).
392. See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 9, 17, Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715 (No. 04–1034).
393. See, e.g., id. at 39–44.
394. See id. at 50.
395. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 757.
396. Id. at 722–57 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion).
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reflecting “entrenched executive error” and overreach.397 Science and effects
were not addressed.398 For him, it was a question of clear language, with a heavy
weighting (it appeared) of concern with regulatory excess.399 He focused on dictionary definitions of “water” or “waters,” the use of “the” before “waters,” the
“waters” relationship to permits required for “point sources,” and a brief foray
into federalism to reject agency deference and the claim of agency jurisdiction.400
Calling his view the “natural,” “common sense,” and even the “only plausible”
reading, he advocated a brand new, unprecedented limiting read.401 His plurality
opinion asserted that the CWA only protected permanently flowing, connected
waters.402
This novel limiting of the statute, in effect, would have newly removed
from federal protection most of the arid West and Southwest, where hot and dry
conditions often leave many riverbeds and other water-linked features dry.403
The nation’s most precious water resources would have been least protected.404
Scalia said nothing about these consequences of this interpretation, apart from
criticizing the dissenters as offering a “policy-laden” conclusion that would (in
his view) let the Army Corps “regulate the entire country as ‘waters of the United
States.’”405
Justice Kennedy’s swing vote opinion, which called for judges to ensure
that disputed waters had a “significant nexus” due to their connections and functions, was mostly embraced by the four dissenters.406 The dissenters agreed with
protecting both Kennedy’s waters and the small but sometimes different waters
protected by the Scalia plurality.407
The resulting mix of Rapanos, SWANCC, the earlier Brown & Williamson
decision have, as a line of precedent, subsequently been harnessed in frequent
calls for “clear statement” presumptions against federal power and against deference to agency power claims.408 Along with the earlier Commerce Clause revival precedents, these cases together create linkable anti-regulatory gambits.
Between 2015 and 2021, the waters battle shifted to agencies and the courts.
The Obama administration by rule in 2015 sought to restore “waters” protections

397. Id. at 722–29, 752 (asserting “immense expansion of federal regulation of land use” and making “error”
point).
398. Id. at 722–57.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 735–38.
401. Id. at 731, 733 n.3, 739.
402. Id. at 739.
403. See Brief of Former EPA Administrators, supra note 391, at 8–9.
404. Id.
405. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 746–47.
406. Id. at 759–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 787–812 (dissenting opinions).
407. Id. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opinion joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer). The dissenters, however, would have reached similar policy conclusions due to deference to regulatory judgments. Id.
at 799, 80708.
408. See e.g., Opening Brief of Petitioners on Core Legal Issues, at 36–41, West Virginia v. E.P.A., (D.C.
Cir. 2016) (No. 15–1363) (emphasizing such arguments in challenge to the Obama administration Clean Power
Plan).
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based substantially on science rather than just a language focus. They sought
comment on and then published a “connectivity” study of all peer reviewed science regarding waters’ functions.409 That study provided the foundation for the
Obama regulation.410 The Trump administration, in a series of reversal actions,
built heavily on the plurality opinion in Rapanos by Justice Scalia to argue that
they legally had to shelve the Obama Clean Waters Rule.411 That action, in turn,
led to judicial challenges, and splintered decisions.412 The Biden administration
commenced its own new waters jurisdiction rulemaking.413 In early 2022, in
Sackett v. EPA, the Supreme Court voted to wade yet again into the waters question despite a strong agency, Department of Justice, and lower court consensus
on waters protected post-Rapanos and despite a transitional moment in agency
interpretations.414
Hence, as with jazz improvisation, the “waters of the United States” battles
reveal the following: despite static statutory language for almost fifty years, and
roughly fifty years of largely settled Commerce Clause jurisprudence, what
seemed settled is in flux. Due to the many actors and institutions sequentially
and strategically interacting—lawyers, scientists, stakeholder groups, states,
agencies, and judges—disparate claims and resources have reshaped “waters”
law.415 Commerce Clause power assertions are now vulnerable, deference weakened, and antiregulatory interests now have a new multi-case spear to attack both
waters regulation and federal power.416 Each shift has triggered changed strategies, much as improvising musicians must adjust to others’ choices, whether predictable or unexpected.417 Below the Article offers a critique of this body of law
based on conceptions of congruence and integrity, with greater sensitivity to context, institutional allocations, and choice consequences.418

409. See generally Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,053
(June 29, 2015) (final rule); see also Connectivity of Streams and Wetlands to Downstream Waters: A Review
and Synthesis of the Scientific Evidence, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,053 (January 14, 2015) (the EPA study).
410. See 80 Fed. Reg. 37,053 (January 14, 2015).
411. See The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 85 Fed. Reg.
22,250, 22,259 (Apr. 21, 2020) (final rule). The Trump Administration’s regulatory roll-back of the Obama-era
Clean Water Rule faced many court challenges. See Pamela King & Hannah Northey, Who’s Suing Over Trump’s
WOTUS Rule?, E&E NEWS: GREENWIRE (June 24, 2020, 1:13 PM), https://www.eenews.net/articles/whos-suingover-trumps-wotus-rule/ [https://perma.cc/VE8S-U8XK] (reviewing challenges).
412. See King & Northey, supra note 411.
413. Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” Proposed Rule, 86 Fed. Reg. 69372 (Dec. 7,
2021).
414. For review of this grant and linked battles, see Hannah Northey & Pamela King, Supreme Court Tees
Up Wetlands Fight That Could Cuff EPA, E&E NEWS: GREENWIRE (Jan. 24, 2022, 1:32 PM), https://www.eenews.net/articles/supreme-court-tees-up-wetlands-fight-that-could-cuff-epa/
[https://perma.cc/ZXN2-9V2M]
(reviewing this grant and linked battles); see also Sackett v. EPA, 8 F.4th 1075 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. granted,
142 S. Ct. 896 (2022).
415. Id.
416. See supra notes 364–65 and accompanying text.
417. See, e.g., Northey & King, supra note 414.
418. See infra Part V.
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Textualism Choices and the “Many Sources” Debate

This Article now explores the jazz improvisation-law analogy by focusing
on a key element of the “new textualism.”419 As seen in the Rapanos Scalia plurality opinion, new textualist statutory interpreters tend to focus on the claimed
ordinary meaning of small portions of a statute’s key operative texts, with linked
claims that this methodology is necessary, legitimate, and results in constraint of
legal actors.420 As the Court’s most prominent textualist, Justice Scalia, wrote for
the Court in the early, foundational textualist West Virginia case, recourse to
purpose or views of sound policy “profoundly mistake[] our role” and the “best
evidence of [statutory] purpose is the statutory text.”421 While virtually all today
agree on the primacy of statutory text, critics of the new textualism champion
more pragmatic and pluralistic methodologies.422 Critics also argue that textualists’ favored moves are erratic, create their own broad interpretive latitude, and
disrespect the coordinate roles of other legal actors and institutions.423
This Subsection focuses on the following question: does a legal focus on a
few words or attention to more surrounding materials result in more interpretive
constraint?424 The implications of musical sparseness or density for improvisatory constraint or freedom help illuminate this ongoing statutory interpretation
dispute.425 In addition, although the cases to be analyzed claim textualist virtue
and parsimony, they actually show strategic choice, erratic fealty to claimed
methods and neutrality, frequent recourse to a growing and different set of other
materials, and questionable logic.426 Looking for the jazz improvisatory-like
moves confirms layers of strategic choosing, not determinate clear outcomes or
methods driven by text alone, inexorable logic, or constitutional necessity.
Freed to look at lots of materials, so the textualist argument goes, legal actors will just seek and rely on what they like.427 As Judge Leventhal quipped,

419. For a recent analysis of the importance of text selection, see generally William N. Eskridge & Victoria
F. Nourse, Textual Gerrymandering: The Eclipse of Republican Government in an Era of Statutory Populism, 96
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1718 (2021).
420. See id. at 1723; see Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 722–57 (2006).
421. W. Va. Univ. Hosp. Inc. v. Casey (West Virginia v. Casey), 499 U.S. 83, 98, 100 (1991).
422. Attention to intent, purpose, and imputation of intent have been part of legal methods going back to
Aristotle. MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 249, at 22–24, 33–36, 41–44, 48–51.
423. See generally Eskridge & Nourse, supra note 419 (highlighting expansive indeterminate textualist
toolchest); Gluck, supra note 234, at 81, 83–85 (same).
424. See Eskridge & Nourse, supra note 419, at 1757 (criticizing “gerrymandering” in textual analysis); see
generally Krishnakumar, supra note 25 (analyzing Roberts Court’s use of the “whole code” move).
425. This issue has generated a substantial body of scholarship. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, The OneCongress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 189–94, 231–32, 236–40 (2000) (questioning unitary drafting practices fiction and cross-statute inferences); see generally Krishnakumar, supra note 25
(critiquing the “whole code” move on the Roberts Court); Samaha, supra note 23 (examining “many sources”
question primarily through logic, probabilities, and math-based analysis). Adrian Vermeule questions “collateral
statute” comparisons versus clause-focused textualism. ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
203–05 (2006).
426. See e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosp. Inc. v. Casey (West Virginia v. Casey), 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
427. In West Virginia v. Casey, Justice Scalia states that additional analysis called for by the dissent of
Justice Stevens would lead to inappropriate judicial overreach. Id. at 88–101.
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partisans could simply look over a crowd and pick out only their friends.428 Textualists claim that partisans (or other legal actors, including judges) under a “consider everything” method could selectively choose and disregard salient materials to reach their own preferred ends.429 A more narrow text-only approach,
textualists argue, better constrains and furthers rule of law aspirations.430
As a matter of logic, if statutory interpretation were akin to a scholar’s solitary etymological search for a best or desired answer—or in musical terms, like
a solo piano player figuring out a wholly written classical music piece—the
claimed textualist concern would have a kernel of logic. Unconstrained solo interpreters might make strategic, quirky, sloppy, or misguided interpretive
choices. Unpredictable or ends-based interpretation would flourish, so the argument goes.431
Legal work never, however, involves a single actor with final authority.
How do comparative claims of constraint and power abuse concerns fare when
one takes into account the actual jazz improvisation-like elements of law? Start
with the realistic assumption that all legal actors—including Supreme Court Justices—are vulnerable to error or politicized actions, all wield multiple forms of
legal authority and make methodological choices, and all engage with multiple
players acting sequentially. Which method—a small, isolated text focus or a
broader analysis of surrounding texts and related legal materials—would better
check overreach or error and, especially, be likely to respect the work of the
principal, namely Congress?
Concededly, both approaches to statutory interpretation—new textualism
with a microtextual focus, versus pragmatic recourse to a broader set of materials—actually involve jazz improvisation-like choices about frames, constraining
texts, and opportunities for choice that can change results.432 The jazz improvisation legal analogy, however, supports the view that textualism’s narrowing focus will tend to free the interpreter more than methods that engage with more
materials. This conclusion links to how law, like ensemble jazz improvisation, is
far from a solitary actor’s etymological search. Instead, the work of law involves
a collective, sequential, contextually constrained practice involving numerous
players. A web of constraining materials that must be engaged leaves far less
latitude for the decider’s own discretionary judgments.
These methodological implications are well illustrated by disputes over judicial power to shift the costs of expert witnesses or consultants as part of a statutory authorization for courts to award “attorney’s fees.”433 But that initial framing—adopted in the famous West Virginia v. Casey case majority opinion by

428. See generally Samaha, supra note 23 (discussing this assertion).
429. Id. at 557.
430. See Eskridge & Nourse, supra note 419, at 1812.
431. Id. at 1718.
432. Id.
433. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (stating that in actions “to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982,
1983, 1985 and 1986 . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States,
a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs”).
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Justice Scalia—was actually debatable from the get-go.434 Why not work with
more of the actual statutory language, which allows the shifting of “attorney’s
fees as a part of costs”?435 Or maybe that too is inadequate. Why not consider
relevant bodies of related law in all of their modes? Such a broadened legal focus
would examine at least the following: the key operative term; surrounding statutory context and structure; the operative logic of the statute; materials from the
process leading to the disputed statutory enactment; judicial precedents; regulatory materials and experience; and perhaps enduring legal norms. Such a subjectarea focus would zero in on law concerning shifting of attorney, expert witness,
and consultant expenses in the civil rights setting. The alternative approach, embraced by the majority in West Virginia v. Casey, was to compare statutory language choices regarding expert expense shifting in other laws, regardless of their
regulatory field, with little attention to clues from other forms of law more directly linked to the case and issues presented.436
As framed by the majority in West Virginia, statutory empowering of
judges to shift “attorney’s fees” was insufficient to authorize shifting of plaintiffs’ expert witness expenses.437 By putting that linguistic microtextual snippet
under the judicial microscope, opponents of expense shifting and then the Court
majority (via Scalia’s opinion), reasoned as follows: Parties bearing their own
attorney’s fees was the American norm under the “American Rule”; deviation
had to be authorized by Congress.438 Second, the Court turned to dozens of other
statutes from different fields of law and policy, calling it the “record of statutory
usage.”439 Many statutes authorize shifting of expert witness expenses, including
laws enacted near the time of the language enactment at issue in West Virginia.440
Because Congress did not similarly include language expressly authorizing shifting expert expenses in the disputed civil rights statute, the Court stated it could
not “eliminate clearly expressed inconsistency of policy and treat alike subjects
that different Congresses have chosen to treat differently.”441 The Court said this
analysis “show[ed] beyond question that attorney’s fees and expert fees are distinct items of expense.”442
This was a powerful argument. But by digging deeper, this conclusion’s
inevitability quickly falls into doubt. First, as just mentioned, the majority

434. See e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosp. Inc. v. Casey (West Virginia v. Casey), 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
435. Emphasis added. For a recent analysis, see Victoria Nourse, Picking and Choosing Text: Lessons for
Statutory Interpretation from the Philosophy of Language 69 FLA. L. REV. 1409, 1410–14, 1425–27 (2017) (criticizing “isolationist” methodology, “pragmatic enrichment” risks, and parsing West Virginia v. Casey.).
436. See id.; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence: A Comment
on Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and Due Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 687, 690 (1992); see generally Buzbee, supra note 425; Krishnakumar, supra note 25;
Samaha, supra note 23.
437. West Virginia v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
438. Id. at 85–101.
439. Id. at 88.
440. Id. at 88–92 (citing such other statutes’ language).
441. Id. at 92.
442. Id. (emphasis added).
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manipulated the text under analysis.443 The actual language was “attorney’s fees
as part of costs.”444 The majority, however, selectively dropped the last four
words of this clause from most of its analysis.445 Yet this largely disregarded
language implies that fees are a form of costs.446 Conceived as a Venn diagram,
costs is the larger category, and attorney’s fees is one item falling into that category.
So, what else could count as “costs”? Might expert witness or consultant
expenses necessary for pursuit of a civil rights case be better viewed as a “cost”
than as a subset of “attorney’s fees”? The Supreme Court itself had already held
that this statutory provision authorized shifting of paralegal expenses.447 Furthermore, the provision at issue, Section 1988, was enacted in rejection of the Supreme Court’s Alyeska ruling, and thereby expressly rejected the default American Rule.448 Under the Court’s approach, however, not only was the American
Rule still given substantial weight, but three divergent drafting choices would
achieve the same result of prohibiting expert expense shifting: (1) an express
prohibition on shifting expert expenses; (2) silence about expenses and cost shifting; or (3) allowing attorney’s fee shifting.449
But the problems went further. The West Virginia Court compared this statute to numerous other statutes authorizing shifting of expert expenses.450 If courts
are to compare other statutes’ language, which statutes? The Court was making
an argument from inference: if so many statutes in disparate areas authorize expert expense shifting, then silence means it is not authorized.451 But why not
focus on linked bodies of law, or work from the same congressional committees,
inferring that those with subject area familiarity might embrace similar statutory
drafting norms?452
Even more importantly, where did the law in all of its forms stand on expense shifting in civil rights and other anti-discrimination litigation? After all,
Political Science 101 and empirical study teach that statutes are not passed or
revised by legislators sitting alone, but with legislators and interest groups motivated by some need, problem, or desire for advantage.453 At a minimum, legislators think about their actions and electoral benefits; they must be delivering

443. Buzbee, supra note 425, at 149.
444. West Virginia v. Casey, 499 U.S. at 103 (emphasis added).
445. Buzbee, supra note 425, at 149.
446. Id.
447. West Virginia v. Casey, 499 U.S. at 98–100 (discussing Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 (1985)).
448. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988; Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)
(substantially limiting judicial discretion to shift attorney’s fees due to the strength of the “American Rule”).
449. For further analysis of this issue, see Buzbee, supra note 425, at 193–94.
450. See West Virginia v. Casey, 499 U.S. at 88–92. For analysis of the Roberts Court’s use of “whole code”
comparisons, see generally Krishnakumar, supra note 25.
451. See VERMEULE, supra note 240, at 202–05 (questioning whether predictable inferences can be drawn
from cross-statutory comparisons).
452. See Krishnakumar, supra note 25, at 87–90, 133–38 (criticizing the “whole code” move if inattentive
to statutes’ linkages); Nourse, supra note 435, at 1425–27 (criticizing case’s method).
453. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983) (discussing
interest group influence in shaping legislation).
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something for somebody, or ideally for an array of stakeholder voters.454 Indeed,
a key underpinning of textualism and against liberal recourse to purpose is that
every statute is its own contested terrain, with most players acting out of selfinterest and often reaching compromise.455
Hence, if the issue is how does the law work in the area of civil rights litigation as related to this particular disputed provision, then that logically needed
to be the focus of analysis. If the law in all of its myriad forms in this area of
law—statutory, regulatory, and case law—generally allowed judicial shifting of
expert costs even without more express statutory authorization, then why invest
in securing new authorizing language from Congress?
Going one step further, note the drafting conundrum created by the Court’s
method. By comparing the disputed provision with dozens of other statutes,
mostly without attention to their time of enactment or subject area, the Court was
making what has been labelled the Whole Act or Code Rule move, or horizontal
statutory interpretation, or interstatutory cross referencing.456 It relies on a “oneCongress fiction” of common drafting practices.457 Here is the conundrum: as
occurred in West Virginia v. Casey, and as earlier noted by Judge Posner, adding
greater statutory specificity to any statute could cause mischief in interpretation
of other unrelated statutes with less specific linguistic choices.458
The Court recounted, but then gave no apparent weight to, the sequence of
legal actions preceding enactment of the Section 1988 language at issue in West
Virginia.459 The Supreme Court’s strengthening of the American Rule in Alyeska
said nothing about expert witness costs, and neither did the legislative cure that
set the stage for West Virginia.460
Legislative history language supportive of expert witness expense shifting
was paradoxically wielded against such power: “this undercuts rather than supports WVUH’s position: The specification would have been quite unnecessary if
the ordinary meaning of the term included those elements.”461 Thus, in a logic

454. Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules,
122 YALE L.J. 70, 87–89, 144–45 (discussing legislators’ need to garner other legislators’ votes and be responsive
to voters).
455. Id.; see generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, Backdoor Purposivism, 69 DUKE L. J. 1275 (2020) (analyzing policy purposes shaping ostensibly textualist Supreme Court opinions).
456. Buzbee, supra note 425, at 232–36. For a large data base and qualitative analysis of cases utilizing the
“whole code” interpretive mode, see generally Krishnakumar, supra note 25.
457. See generally Buzbee, supra note 425 (questioning “one-Congress fiction” behind interstatutory comparisons).
458. Friedrich v. City of Chi., 888 F.2d 511, 516–17 (7th Cir. 1989), vacated, 499 U.S. 933 (1991) (in light
of West Virginia v. Casey), 499 U.S. 83 (1991)); see also Buzbee, supra note 425, at 189 (discussing Edwards v.
United States, 814 F.2d 486, 488 (7th Cir. 1987) and stating interstatutory referencing without regard to time of
enactment “‘will make the body of unrepealed statutes a minefield for [a] new law’”).
459. West Virginia v. Casey, 499 U.S. at 92–102.
460. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988; Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
461. West Virginia v. Casey, 499 U.S. at 91–92, 91 n.5 (saying this language was “an apparent effort to
depart from ordinary meaning and to define a term of art”). For further analysis of this language in a linked
successor case, noting the “as part of” language but still declining shift of expert expenses, see Arlington Cent.
School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 292 (2006).
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puzzler, legislative history cutting in either direction would lead to the same inference.
In the wake of the Court’s decision, Aleinikoff and Shaw questioned the
case’s “horizontal” cross-statutory cross referencing.462 They advocated “vertical” history analysis of relevant statutes and legal treatment on that issue in that
area over time in Congress and the courts.463 If civil rights litigation often requires expert assistance, and Congress sought to spark private claims with fee
shifting, they argued, under what logic would Congress silently prohibit what
was needed and previously allowed?464 More broadly, why ever expect that Congress would draft across fields in a single way when legislators change, coalitions
shift within Congress, agencies change priorities, plus lines of case precedent are
distinct to subject areas?465
Moreover, textualism is rooted in claimed need for predictable and constraining methodology, making horizontal whole code analysis a problem: how
could any litigant or legislator anticipate what statutes might be cross referenced?466 Furthermore, by making the focusing choice, where the Court looked
at “attorney’s fees,” ignored surrounding language, and refused to look at “disconfirming” materials, the Court avoided materials that might refute an initial
judicial inclination.467
Such choices about the size of the textual cluster or broader analysis of
other laws are critical, yet hard to predict. As Professors Eskridge and Nourse
label the “petty textualism,” “isolationist,” or textual “gerrymandering” move,
textualist courts will often focus on a microtext—sometimes a few words.468 In
other cases, however, textualists will analyze surrounding language, and sometimes broader context, statutory structure, or consequences of alternative
reads.469 Such a judicial choice to focus narrowly or look more broadly, or assess
consequences of interpretive choices, can change outcomes.
That the narrow or broadened lens can be decisive is readily evident. In
West Virginia v. Casey, the focus was on the presence or absence of language
about expert expenses, with consequences and larger structural and overall law
analysis ignored.470 Undercutting incentives for bringing data-intensive civil
rights cases did not matter. In contrast, in Utility Air Regulatory Group
(“UARG”), the Court rejected the interpretation called for by the Clean Air Act’s
language and numbers in a case concerning agency power to require permits for

462. Aleinikoff & Shaw, supra note 436, at 697.
463. Id. at 696–98.
464. Id.
465. Buzbee, supra note 425, at 204–20.
466. Id. at 236–39 (discussing the unpredictability problem).
467. VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 115–16 (2016). The Alito majority
and Breyer dissent engage with these materials’ implications, but through clashing methods. See generally Arlington Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006).
468. See Eskridge & Nourse, supra note 419, at 1730 (highlighting significance of word cluster choice and
manipulation).
469. See generally Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005).
470. W. Va. Univ. Hosp. Inc. v. Casey (West Virginia v. Casey), 499 U.S. 83, 92 (1991).
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greenhouse gas polluters.471 Relying heavily on broader contextual and structural
analysis and consequences of possible statutory views, the Court majority limited
the powers of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).472 Similarly, the
plurality Rapanos opinion about “waters” jurisdiction, reviewed above, went on
for pages about alleged regulatory overreach, mostly based on reported cases
that, by definition, involved jurisdictional claims of overreach.473 That same ostensibly textualist opinion, however, gave virtually no weight to the CWA’s own
stated goals, criteria guiding agency work, or benefits of waters’ protections, or
agency science about such effects.474
In other Court opinions, notably the Court’s rejection of a statutory challenge to the Affordable Care Act in King v. Burwell, a majority of justices used
a broader lens form of textualism that integrates analysis of text, context, structure, the functions of statutory provisions, plus consequences of disputed interpretive choices, while still largely shunning legislative history.475 Varying approaches to a statute’s operational logic are also evident in the recent Bostock
case.476 Self-proclaimed textualists Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh clash, with
Gorsuch looking to see how the key operative prohibition works in practice.477
Kavanaugh, in contrast, focused more on what he believed enactors would have
meant (or perhaps intended at the time) in using the word “sex.”478 Hence, variants of textualist methodology can drive dramatically different outcomes.
Where one comes out on the “expert witness” expense shifting question, or
the merits of microtextualism versus more contextual, structural, and consequence-focused analysis, is less relevant to this Article than two key lessons.
First, the foundational West Virginia v. Casey textualist opinion, despite its
claims of restraint and necessity, actually involved an abundance of interpretive
choices and manipulations.479 Nothing dictated the methodology wielded or even
the texts chosen; it was a deviation from then-prevalent interpretive methods. It
also rested on a disputable normative claim that its methodology is more institutionally appropriate.
Second, by making selective text choices, as well as choices to downplay
historical materials and attention to consequences, the West Virginia v. Casey
majority was, like the choices of improvising jazz musicians, building from strategic choices about what to utilize.480 The paucity of materials considered freed
up the Court, allowing it to reach a seemingly powerful conclusion. The crossstatutory comparisons and minimal grappling with vertical history and

471. See Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. E.P.A., 573 U.S. 302, 316 (2014).
472. See id. at 321–34 (calling for examination of broader context and breadth of regulation).
473. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 733–46 (2006).
474. See notes 389–410 and accompanying text.
475. See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 484–98 (2015).
476. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738–44 (2020).
477. See Eskridge & Nourse, supra note 419, at 1718–22 (analyzing differences in textualist method evident
in Bostock).
478. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1830–34 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
479. See generally W. Va. Univ. Hosp. Inc. v. Casey (West Virginia v. Casey), 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
480. See id. at 99–100.
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interpretive consequences left largely unaddressed the decision’s own effects and
logic (or illogic) of the result.481 In contrast, in cases using a text-dominant analytical method that attends more to surrounding language, context, structure, and
consequences, and whether that broader set of materials meshes with textually
apparent goals, with King v. Burwell a paradigmatic recent example, the Court
seems far less free.482
Similar choices about methods and which constraining materials to emphasize is a constant of jazz improvisation. Jazz improvisation provides its own analogical answer to the question of whether grappling with more or fewer sources
results in greater constraint of a legal actor.483 Musicians consistently view less
dense accompaniment or musical forms as a way to free up the improviser, as
critics of microtextual methodology see happening in law.484 A narrowed legal
lens gives the interpreter broad space for “pragmatic enrichment” and heightens
risks of error due to inattention to disconfirming and clarifying materials.485 Similarly, if an improvising jazz soloist in an ensemble wants greater freedom, then
the surrounding musical fabric is simplified and chord-based accompaniment is
even sometimes jettisoned.486 A jazz improviser accompanied by no one has
massive freedom.487 Without the contextualizing constraints of other musicians,
almost anything could work.488 Add a drummer, and the freedom diminishes.
Add a bassist or especially if one also adds a chordal instrument like a piano,
then the soloist making improvising choices is yet more constrained. Denser accompanist choices and more detailed music will constrain the lead improviser.
Choices of notes, pacing, and tone are in the collective’s hands, even if some
improvising choices remain for the lead soloist.489
In a 1950s interview, John Coltrane discussed how improviser freedom is
enhanced with less chord-based accompaniment of a piano.490 He stated that
“when you’re not playing on a given progression, . . . it would get in your way
to have somebody point in another direction and you trying to go in another,
there it would be better for you not to have it.”491 McCoy Tyner, a jazz piano
master, for similar reasons used modal scale styles and less defined chord voicings to open up choices for others: “I would leave space, which wouldn’t identify

481. See id. at 87.
482. See generally King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015).
483. See supra Subsections III.C.4, IV.D.3.
484. See supra Subsection III.C.4.
485. See generally Nourse, supra note 435.
486. See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text (discussing implications of density of accompaniment).
487. See supra Section III.B.
488. See Coleman, supra note 1, at 114.
489. See id.
490. FRANK KOFSKY, BLACK NATIONALISM AND THE REVOLUTION IN Music 231 (Pathfinder Press 1970)
(Coltrane interview).
491. Id.

BUZBEE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1]

JAZZ IMPROVISATION AND THE LAW

11/28/22 5:02 PM

157

the chord so definitely to the point that it inhibited your other voicings.”492 With
such voicings, he would “create[] more space for improvisers.”493 As Coltrane
stated more poetically, Tyner “gives me wings and lets me take off from the
ground from time to time.”494 Newer jazz arrival Joel Ross, a vibraphonist, similarly explains: “The more notes you have, the more you’re dictating the harmony, and I don’t want to do that.”495
Similarly, the move of Ahmad Jamal, Miles Davis, and Bill Evans, influenced by music theorist George Russell, to shift to modal scale soloing over a
sequence of measures, instead of measure-by-measure chord-based or melodyrooted improvisation, also facilitated less constricted playing.496 Modal conceptions eased the task of weaving of new melodies, motifs, and themes in that improvisation.497
Whether one views this “text alone versus more materials” debate as akin
to a limited palette498, or through math logic499, or through cognitive psychology
and the “focusing” illusion,500 or here through the jazz improvisation analogy,
the law conclusion is the same: the frequent statutory textualist moves to narrow
the perspective and even shun other materials are moves that broaden the legal
actor’s interpretive choice. If you add erratic methods in ignoring or considering
consequences of an interpretive choice, or choosing texts or broader context or
structure, then even more outcome-determinative discretion exists.501 Such statutory interpretation methodological variation is akin to a jazz improviser who
not only is minimally constrained by others’ choices, but also rapidly shifts in
genre and style choices. This form of textualism is thus, paradoxically, like the
least structured forms of free or out jazz.502 With erratic methods or minimal
reference to constraining materials, legal actors give themselves vast latitude for
choice.503 If, instead, legal or musical actors must consistently mesh with others’
earlier contributions and contemporaneous choices, especially with careful
“faithful agent” efforts respecting legislatively set policies, freedom is greatly
diminished.504

492. Ben Ratliff, McCoy Tyner, Jazz Piano Powerhouse, is Dead at 81, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2020) https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/03/06/arts/music/mccoy-tyner-dead.html [https://perma.cc/HR6H-Q5TU] (quoting
Tyner).
493. Id. (quoting music critic Ben Ratliff).
494. Id. (quoting John Coltrane).
495. Giovanni Russonello, How the Vibraphonist Joel Ross Keeps Finding Fresh Rhythms, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/arts/music/joel-ross-good-vibes-who-are-you.html
[https://perma.cc/3UHN-SW4L].
496. See supra at 144–49 and accompanying text (introducing modal improvisation).
497. See supra Section III.C.
498. See Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 1565, 1596–97 (discussing the incompleteness of textualism).
499. See generally Samaha, supra note 23.
500. See Nourse, supra note 435, at 1424.
501. See id. at 1423.
502. See supra Section III.E.
503. See supra Subsection IV.D.3.
504. See Merrill, supra note 498, at 1579 (emphasizing faithful agent considerations).
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Administrative Law Deference Contestation

As its last case study of jazz-like elements that pervade law, the Article
turns to contestation over judicial deference to agency policymaking. The very
concept of legal “deference” has a logic much like the practices of jazz improvisation: “deference” from reviewing courts leaves agencies room for varied
choices and judgments—exercises of discretion—within frameworks that constrain.505 That core of deference is part of this Subsection’s analysis, but the principal focus here is on doctrinal emergence and transformation. It focuses first on
enduring rationales for deference, then legal changes surrounding the Chevron
scope of review framework, and then traces the emergence and evolution of the
“major questions doctrine,” a reviewing frame strengthened and decisive in the
2022 West Virginia v. EPA decision.506 Here too, one again finds legal choice,
change, strategic avoidance, and reframing, with shifting doctrine sometimes unmoored from its logic and underpinnings.
For most of the twentieth century, agencies were viewed as deserving of
deference from reviewing courts, with enduring (although now questioned) key
justifications: Congress chose an agency to handle a problem; agencies know
more than courts do about their regulatory field’s law and on-the-ground effects;
and agencies are more politically accountable than courts due to three factors.
First, Congress through statutes delegates subject-area responsibilities to the
agency. Second, agency leadership is accountable via the President and also subject to democratic input due to Senate advice and consent through the confirmation process. Third, agencies must act transparently and justify their choices
through quasi-democratic and interactive adjudicatory or rulemaking modes requiring notice, input opportunities, and agency justification.507 Cases like Universal Camera, Hearst, and Skidmore began to articulate and sharpen why, when,
and how courts should review and usually defer to agency judgments.508
Chevron was built from these familiar pieces, but involved a major agency
policy shift and new Supreme Court language describing deference.509 The Supreme Court accepted EPA room, via a promulgated notice-and-comment regulation, to allow states and regulated polluters to make pollution control choices
as though their facilities emitted pollution into a bubble.510 This, in effect, meant
505. Professor Strauss describes this logic of deference. See Peter L. Strauss, Deference is Too Confusing—
Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012) (describing
the logic of deference).
506. See West Virginia v. E.P.A., 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2607–16 (2022) (articulating the major questions doctrine
factors and applying them to the question of EPA power). See infra Subsection IV.D.4 (discussing West Virginia
v. EPA’s major questions analysis).
507. See Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpretation, 2009 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 89, 104–05 (2009) (in comparing institutional competence of courts and agencies to further delegated
goals); see also Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109
NW. U. L. REV. 871, 875 (2015) (discussing agency accountability, expertise, why agencies must consider purposes, and judicial review).
508. See generally MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 2 (presenting foundational cases).
509. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
510. See id. at 865–66.
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sources could engage in flexible internal trading and production adjustments,
thereby often avoiding more rigid and costly methods to reduce pollution.511
The Chevron Court, however, reformulated deference framing language
into the now familiar Chevron two-step.512 Under step one, courts should give no
deference to an agency if Congress has answered the “precise question at issue.”513 Under step two, courts should give substantial deference to an agency’s
reasonable interpretive policy choice if Congress left a statutory silence, gap, or
ambiguity.514 Chevron was not claimed to be a radical break from earlier courtagency deference frameworks.515 It also confirmed that agencies can change policies despite unchanged statutory language.516 None of this was new.517 But
Chevron’s new language toggled between no deference and substantial deference, rather than earlier more holistic assessments of agency discretion and judicial deference.518
Much as new musical conceptions free up new performance ideas, the case
quickly was seized upon to broaden agency calls for judicial deference.519 Chevron involved a notice-and-comment rulemaking, but the opinion did not focus
upon that procedural posture.520 So agencies sought deference for virtually any
agency law interpretation linkable to language indeterminacy.521 An agency view
in a brief? A top regulator’s memorandum? Chevron deference was claimed.522
However, although Chevron blessed the business-friendly bubble trading
policy, its usual step two deferential frame could also be used by agencies to
expand their turf or push policies disliked by stakeholders.523 It also allowed
agencies to keep innovating and adjusting even during periods of political gridlock.524
As the years went by, Chevron was refined, riddled with exceptions, and
subject to a growing number of settings where either it did not apply or deference
weakened.525 For example, expansive uses of Chevron to favor the government
with little attention to agency’s procedural form (or modality) were checked by
the Mead case.526 Chevron’s deference frame was, via Mead, generally narrowed
511. See id.
512. For analysis of Chevron’s framework and surrounding law, see Michael Herz, Chevron is Dead: Long
Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1872 (2015).
513. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
514. Id. at 843.
515. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of An Accidental Landmark, 66 ADMIN.
L. REV. 253, 276 (2014) (tracing Chevron’s unexpected path).
516. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64.
517. See Merrill, supra note 515, at 255.
518. Id. at 256.
519. See id. at 263.
520. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840–66.
521. See Merrill, supra note 515, at 256.
522. See Chicago v. Env’t Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 339 (1994) (discussing but disregarding views in new
EPA administrator memorandum used by government lawyers in call for deference).
523. See Merrill, supra note 515, at 256.
524. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840–66.
525. See Herz, supra note 512, at 1867–79 (questioning Chevron’s novelty and reviewing exceptions).
526. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 238–39 (2001).
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to a subset of actions where the agency was authorized to act with the “force of
law” and the agency acted through deliberative process, generally through notice-and-comment rulemakings.527 Scholars, judges, and litigants have also made
clear that step two cases have embedded within them step one questions, meaning the judicial reviewing role remains important in all cases.528
The weakening and shrinking of Chevron territory continued. More of
Chevron “reasonableness” analysis at step two is now acknowledged to overlap
with “arbitrary and capricious” and “reasoned decision-making” judicial review
usually seen as governed by the Overton Park and State Farm cases.529 Statutory
language may leave room for interpretation, but when the choice is more about
science, facts, contested policy, or agency response to criticisms, the agency
choice can be rejected under more rigorous “hard look review.”530 A new “step
zero” emerged, wholly bypassing Chevron.531
This Subsection now turns to the jazz improvisation-like elements in the
emergence, transformation, and then unmooring of the “major questions” canon
or doctrine from its roots. This doctrine emerged from precedent language and
democracy-respecting rationales linked to deference doctrine, but it has become
a doctrine to undercut choices of Congress and agencies despite their multiple
layers of political accountability.532 This new doctrinal move, so far, has usually
been wielded against agency power, typically with little attention to a statute’s
protective goals. In the blockbuster 2022 West Virginia v. EPA case, its application was decisive.533
The major questions doctrine, in its most basic and early form, is a judicially created doctrine that courts should skeptically and carefully review agency
actions that involve the following concurrent attributes: a new sort of agency
claim of power, where the textual grounding is weak, and the regulatory action
involves issues or maybe effects of great economic or political significance.534 If
applied, either agency power is rejected, or narrowed, or deference frameworks
nullified.535 Given that Chevron involved a regulation of most factories in the
United States, and with a new regulatory tool, a new Chevron exception due to a

527. See id.at 229.
528. See Herz, supra note 512, at 1870.
529. Id. at 1884.
530. See generally id.
531. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006) (exploring threshold questions about Chevron’s applicability).
532. See id. at 193.
533. See West Virginia v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. at 2607–16 (reviewing precedents, embracing the major questions
doctrine label, and using it to reject EPA’s interpretation of “best system of emission reduction” even if agency
had a “plausible textual basis” for its action due to lack of “’clear congressional authorization’”) (citation omitted)). For critical analyses of earlier developments of this doctrine, see Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 2000 (2017) (arguing that the so-called “power canons” have no basis in law and
are contrary to congressional intent); Jonas J. Monast, Major Questions About the Major Questions Doctrine, 68
ADMIN. L. REV. 445, 457–59 (2016); Note, Major Question Objections, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2191, 2197 (2016).
534. See Note, supra note 533, at 2196–2202.
535. See id. at 2191 (highlighting “mercurial” uses of this doctrine).
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major question has always been a puzzler.536 Indeed, all federal rulemakings result in national law and usually will have major effects.
The major questions exception to deference started with a somewhat modest strain that was reconcilable with Chevron’s respect for Congress delegating
power to agencies.537 Courts asked if it made sense to find or assume an agency
had the interpretive power claimed.538 In MCI, the Court did not deny that key
statutory language—”modify”—could encompass an array of actions and meanings, but that seeming trigger for Chevron deference was rejected.539 It was, the
Court concluded, too slender a textual reed to authorize agency elimination of a
key regulatory tool.540
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson, the major questions doctrine really began
to emerge.541 Despite broadly worded statutory power conferred on the Food &
Drug Administration (“FDA”), the Court rejected FDA power to regulate tobacco product advertising.542 The agency had earlier disavowed power to regulate tobacco (sometimes due to lack of factual basis), plus Congress had itself
directly regulated tobacco in several other laws.543 Collectively, the Court found,
they signaled that Congress had not delegated to the FDA the power claimed.544
Brown & Williamson included language that became part of the heart of the major questions counter to Chevron deference.545 Courts need to question an “implicit delegation” to agencies in light of the “nature of the question” presented.546
In “extraordinary cases,” courts might “hesitate” to find such delegation, especially using “common sense” to determine if Congress is “likely to delegate a
decision” of such “economic and political significance” to the agency.547
In Whitman v. American Trucking, the Court closely examined and compared Clean Air Act provisions and declined to imply agency obligation to consider costs when other provisions required attention to economic impacts and
costs.548 Congress would not put “elephants in mouseholes.”549 While the case
did not build on the major question precedents, its inferences from statutory
structure became an important part of this doctrine.550

536. Id.
537. Id. at 2197.
538. Id. at 2195.
539. MCI Telecomms. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1994).
540. Id. at 229–32.
541. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (applying the major question doctrine to the regulation of the tobacco industry).
542. Id. at 120.
543. Id. at 146.
544. Id. at 161.
545. See Note, supra note 533, at 2201, 2220.
546. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159–60.
547. Id.
548. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 457 (2001).
549. Id. at 468.
550. See Heinzerling, supra note 533, at 1977–78.
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By the time of UARG, the focus on the extent of agency powers became
central, with a linked resistance to agency power to act in new ways.551 In 2021
and 2022 decisions and battles over climate regulation and federal powers to address the COVID-19 pandemic, the major questions doctrine has become central.552 The focus now is often almost entirely on the alleged novelty of the
agency action and claimed huge effects, with the focus on burdens allegedly
borne by opponents of regulation.553
In 2022’s West Virginia v. EPA decision, most notably, the Court acknowledged a “plausible textual basis” for EPA’s regulation of coal burning power
plants based on actual system-based arrangements under which required emissions levels were set with reference to measures on and off site.554 And although
any analysis based on “best” benchmarking—the express statutory mandate—
will tend to generate dynamic updating that reflects innovations, the Court found
the shift in regulatory outcomes suspect.555 It also downplayed Congress’s statutory change of operative language from “technology” to “system” in light of
how it would result in a “transformative expansion” in the agency’s authority.556
Rather than finding the congressional choice to amend the statute to use the term
“system” decisive or even illuminating, the Court called it “an empty vessel” and
“a vague statutory grant.”557 Furthermore, that the actual regulation under discussion had never come into effect, yet its goals been exceeded by other technological and market changes, was sidestepped; the action was still claimed to have
such a huge “magnitude and consequence” that even clearer authorization was
needed.558
The new strong judge-empowering form of the major questions doctrine
thus now downplays legislative language, congressional allocations of power,
relative expertise, statutory goals, science, actual proof of claimed huge effects,
or concerns with judicial restraint.559 Judges are empowered, agencies reeled in,
and express, enacted congressional policy goals are given little close or balanced
attention. Costs of compliance or concerns of those opposing regulation are given
heavy if not exclusive weight, while express protective statutory policies are
given short shrift.

551. Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. E.P.A., 573 U.S. 302, 333–34 (2014) (rejecting EPA power to regulate smaller
greenhouse gas emitters, but allowing regulation of sources already regulated).
552. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021) (per curiam)
(applying doctrine to reject federal power to impose eviction moratorium due to COVID risks); West Virginia v.
E.P.A., 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2610 (2022).
553. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489 (focusing on hardship to landlords of eviction moratoria,
federalism, “breathtaking” agency power claims, and lack of precedent).
554. West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. at 2609.
555. See id. at 2614.
556. Id. at 2609–14.
557. Id. at 2614.
558. Id. at 2616–17.
559. Id; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., 142 S. Ct. 661, 665 (2022) (per curiam)
(rejecting OSHA COVID business vaccination mandate, citing Alabama “major questions” discussion, focusing
on employees opposed to vaccination, and stating agency cannot regulate risk that is same in workplace and
society).

BUZBEE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1]

11/28/22 5:02 PM

JAZZ IMPROVISATION AND THE LAW

163

Hence, like the ever-evolving choices of jazz improvisation, the most prevalent and cited governing deference frame since the 1980s has nonetheless been
used and tested strategically, remade, and recast. The major questions doctrine
has itself emerged as a powerful countermove, increasingly unmoored from its
initial close focus on what Congress chose or would logically choose in each
particular statute.560 Judicial views about regulatory overreach are now generally
imputed to Congress, often without any attempt to document the existence of
such congressional concerns or engage agency record materials analyzing the
both the risks and benefits of regulatory choices.561
These doctrinal uses and refinements of deference doctrine reveal, as with
jazz improvisation, selective strategic choosing, leading to new lines of argument. Rhetoric of restraint, modesty, and concerns with unchecked power are
part of the Roberts Court’s language.562 Nonetheless, through the major question
doctrine’s transformation and prominence, courts are newly freed to engage in
value-laden judgments about regulatory wisdom and excess with little respect for
the work of Congress or agency expertise and delegated missions.
V. REASONED DISCRETION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSEQUENTIAL
CONGRUENCE
Jazz improvisation in its practices and interactions is thus much like the
doing of law. Both are subject to constraining frames that over time change.
Rules, institutions, and actors interact sequentially and strategically and, as a result, choice is pervasive and certainty elusive.563 The prevalence of choice does
not, however, mean unconstrained choice, or choice that is beyond criteria for
critical assessment. That could be the end of this Article: law and jazz improvisation share many modal similarities, making sense of law’s balance of movement and constraint. Law is not just about mere reading, or obedience, or balls
and strikes, or like classical music interpretation.564
This conclusion, while accurate, does raise a logical concern that calls for
normative and prescriptive analysis. If law involves so much sequential, strategic
constrained choosing and change, are there legal methods that best further rule
of law aspirations, keeping change and choice bounded and potential abuses of
power constrained? This Part offers two main claims: First, engaging, rather than
shunning, the many sources shaping legal choice and change is a better strategy
to constrain than is reliance on false claims of determinacy or mere claimed obedience to an often unduly or selectively narrowed set of legal materials.565
560. See Note, supra note 533, at 2208; West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. at 2632 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
561. See Note, supra note 533, at 2208; West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. at 2631 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
562. West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
563. Fallon’s similarly calls for “interpretive eclecticism” and acknowledgement of “legally constrained
normative judgment.” Fallon, supra note 6, at 1306–08.
564. See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text (introducing these claims about the nature of law).
565. Cf. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 89 (1995)
(discussing judicial reasoned judgment and calling Herbert Wechsler’s disregard of “emotions” and “the experience of oppression” in writing about segregation as having “about it a bizarre sort of Martian neutrality”).
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Second, legal actors should always assess the legal consequences of their own
constrained choices for congruence with the legal materials shaping those
choices, with priority given to legislative policy judgments and power allocations
reflected in the law.566 As a shorthand, this Article labels such analysis of context
and choice consequences the assessment of consequential congruence.
A.

Consequential Congruence

This Article is not calling for mere obedience or interpretation or freezing
of the law, but assessment of consequential congruence. This shorthand phrase
attempts to distill the following recommended practice: a legal decider or advocate should analyze whether a seemingly tenable legal choice is compatible with
the surrounding materials, institutions, and layers of law and method choice that
law pervasively involves, with respect for institutional primacy. Such a mix of
backwards-looking analysis and ownership of a legal actor’s own choices serves
to check imprudence and error, plus institutionalize respect for other legal actors’
roles.567 Such transparent analysis of consequential congruence also makes the
new legal action more fully explicated and, as a result, prospectively constraining.568 Consistent attention to contextual materials and consequences would also
predictably refocus attention on the branches with policymaking primacy—Congress and the executive branch—and constrain judicial temptations to remake
policies into what judges might prefer. After all, as Chief Justice Burger stated
for the Court in TVA v. Hill, it is “emphatically” the “exclusive province of the
Congress not only to formulate legislative policies . . . but also to establish their
relative priority for the [n]ation.”569
This call for attention to consequences of a legal actor’s choice or argument
is not the same as traditional “purposive” interpretation.570 Far from it. Purposive
interpretation tends to emphasize a backward-looking assessment of the purposes
manifested in the legal text, or perhaps the goals of the earlier law creators or
speakers.571 It has often been mixed with arguments against reliance on unenacted legislative reports and statements—so called “legislative history”—but evidence of purpose is found in many forms.572 At its most questionable, purposive

566. See discussion infra Section V.C.
567. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
568. See generally Stack, supra note 26 (exploring agency preambles’ explanatory and constraining roles).
For exploration of reasoned judgments as key to check courts as a “naked power organ,” see NUSSBAUM, supra
note 565, at 87–88 (discussing Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1959) and emphasizing need for attention to “social and historical facts”).
569. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
570. For explorations of purposive analysis debates, see David M. Driesen, Purposeless Construction, 48
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 122 (2013); Herz, supra note 507, at 92; Krishnakumar, supra note 455, at 1275–76;
Stack, supra note 507, at 871.
571. Herz, supra note 507, at 93.
572. Recent scholarship reveals that the line between public law enactment, history, and the statute’s usually
understood text is highly dependent on codification and drafting choices of congressional staff. See Jesse M.
Cross & Abbe R. Gluck, The Congressional Bureaucracy, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1541, 1634 (2020); Jarrod Shobe,
Codification and the Hidden Work of Congress, 67 UCLA L. REV. 640, 690 (2020).
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interpretation can be wielded to go beyond bargains evident in the underlying
legal text.573
Instead, this Part is suggesting legal actors should assess if their own preferred or tentatively selected choice is better than alternative possibilities, but
not in the sense of furthering the legal actor’s personal preferences or undertaking untethered “welfarist” analysis. Instead legal actors should assess how this
possible choice meshes with accumulated wisdom, logic, and stated goals and
criteria in the area of law, especially legislative choices and later agency materials documenting effects of inaction or the agency choice.574 This includes giving
weight to the political branches’ assessments of effects that the preceding and
governing law prioritize, such as science regarding health risks and benefits, or
pollution harms, or data regarding discrimination, or studies of market practices
or failures. Then that later actor considers the consequences, in the sense of the
likely effects, of the later actor’s own legal choices. Analysis of legal consequences thus has a different temporal focus and function than sometimes maligned purposive method.
Attention to choice consequences is central to effective jazz improvisation
and similar to the legal practice suggested here. Musicians must follow the rules
and practices of improvisation, especially each tune’s constraining forms, while
making their own new choices sensitive to where the collective musical output
is collectively, dynamically moving.575 Master jazz bassist Gary Peacock captured well improvising musicians’ blend of text-bound constraint and collective,
creative choosing, saying the music is “like flowers”: “The idea is to really nourish them . . . . You wouldn’t trample them . . . . How do I nourish these flowers
so they can really express themselves?”576 Likewise, assessing and seeking to
mesh legal choice consequences with surrounding law and, especially, with respect for institutional capacities and roles of others is not a freeing move, but a
way to constrain.
B.

Consequence-Shunning Jurisprudence

Forms and examples of consequence-blindered legal actions are many. Any
assertion of power through law that declares an outcome, yet is not accompanied
by a reasoned justification, is the antithesis of law and, of course, does not explore consequences.577 A case in point is the Roberts Supreme Court’s frequent
unexplained stays of lower court or, less frequently, executive branch actions,
573. Herz, supra note 507, at 92 n.11.
574. See Merrill, supra note 498, at 1583–90 (rejecting “welfarist” approach to statutory interpretation if
not tempered with “faithful agent” focus on congressional choices).
575. Silbey & Ewick, supra note 58, at 497.
576. Russonello, supra note 187 (quoting Peacock).
577. For discussion of this increased use of stays without opinions, see Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor
General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 123, 156–57 (2019). See also LON FULLER, THE MORALITY
OF LAW 34–39 (1969) (through parable of King Rex, explaining why government by fiat is problematic and why
key elements of law are likely to arise); Will Baude, Death and the Shadow Docket, REASON: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Apr. 12, 2019, 3:30 PM), https://reason.com/2019/04/12/death-and-the-shadow-docket/ [https://
perma.cc/WW7L-ANWX].
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under what is now referred to as the Court’s “shadow docket.”578 It has rightly
been characterized as a mere assertion of power, lacking the key attributes of
legitimate legal action.579
Another form of legal action inattentive to consequence are court decisions,
especially from the U.S. Supreme Court, claiming a legal text is so clear that the
Court shuns other presented materials and arguments, sidestepping consideration
of whether the Court’s own choice consequences make sense in light of surrounding law. For example, in the Supreme Court’s Aviall case, the Court faced
a huge question under the nation’s Superfund law, known generally by its acronym, CERCLA.580 Could contamination cleanup volunteers sue others responsible for site contamination under an express statutory contribution cause of action? The Court said no, not unless the plaintiff had already been sued by or
settled with the government.581 This ruling undercut incentives for private actors
to clean up contaminated sites, frustrated the express goals of the statute, mostly
disregarded text that contradicted the majority’s answer, and unsettled both the
lower court consensus and private contractual practices.582 But the Court declined to discuss the consequences of its own interpretation: “Given the clear
meaning of the text, there is no need to resolve this dispute [over policy impacts]
or to consult the purpose of CERCLA at all.”583
Likewise, in Rapanos, the Scalia plurality opinion, analyzed above, analyzed dictionaries and made extensive claims of regulatory overreach based on
cases, but was inattentive to costs, benefits, and science systematically amassed
by the agency, leading to the plurality’s conclusion that the CWA could only
protect permanently flowing connected waters.584 Claiming this was the compelled conclusion about the statute’s reach, the opinion left undiscussed whether
it made sense to eliminate the Act’s protections in much of the arid West and
Southwest.585 This conclusion clashed with the statute’s express national reach,
express focus on protecting waters’ integrity and aquatic functions, and prohibitions against any filling of waters or polluting without a permit.586 Such disparate
rules for different states also arguably clashed with “equal sovereignty” federalism norms and usual expectations of nationally uniform federal regulation.587

578. Vladeck, supra note 577, at 125.
579. Id. at 156–60 (discussing Supreme Court decisions lacking accompanying reasoning).
580. Cooper Ind. v. Aviall Servs., Inc. (Aviall), 543 U.S. 157, 167 (2004) (discussing Section 113(f)(1) of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(1)).
581. Id. at 158.
582. Id. at 171–74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
583. Id. at 167.
584. See supra notes 395–400 and accompanying text (reviewing opinion).
585. See id.
586. See supra notes 354–62 and accompanying text (discussing waters protection history).
587. See e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Pubs. Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130–31 (1944) (deferring to agency categorizing
of employees and referring to “intended national uniformity” of national legislation); Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 2001 (2014) (discussing prevalence of congressional uniformity goals
and some statutes’ express allowance of varied state policies).
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Or, in the standing arena, the TransUnion majority claimed constraint with
its repeated reference to tradition.588 But the Court, ignoring its own contrary
precedents, did not explain how it knew that the regulated business abuses were
inconsequential.589 Plus, nowhere did it address the separation of powers implications of its decision.590 It nowhere discussed what Congress might know about
regulated business-caused harms and practices and, as a comparative matter,
what courts do not know.591 It did not analyze how its partial denial of standing
would reshape the statute’s functioning.592 It is akin to an unconvincing and mechanical, but also theoretically erroneous, jazz solo. It meshes with almost nothing other than portions of language in Lujan and Spokeo and perhaps a shared
policy preference for less citizen litigation against business.593 It directly defeats
express congressional goals and design.594
Contrasting views about consideration of consequences are evident in the
Supreme Court’s Clean Air Act Engine Manufacturers decision.595 The question
was whether the Clean Air Act’s preemption of state emission “standards” for
manufacturers of new cars also prohibited states or municipalities from requiring
fleet operators to use vehicles much cleaner than federally required.596 The Court
majority read the Clean Air Act’s preemptive provision broadly, claiming clear
text, but went no further in its analysis, claiming that no rationale or reason could
justify a contrary read.597 Justice Souter, in dissent, looked at alternative reads of
that provision, legislative history that uniformly showed the preemption concern
was to preserve manufacturing economies of scale, anti-preemption norms, and
how consequences of a non-preemptive read meshed with other statutory provisions and the statute’s logic.598 Souter’s dissent, by engaging with the law’s overall structures, logic, and choice consequences, is far more attentive to consequential congruence than the majority.599
Another notable Supreme Court example reviewed above is the West Virginia v. Casey case.600 The Court found irrelevant whether prohibiting shifting of
expert expenses would largely preclude civil rights litigation that Congress
sought to encourage.601 To be swayed by concern about policy impacts, the Court
stated, “profoundly mistakes our role” and “is not for judges to prescribe.”602

588.
589.
590.
591.
592.
593.
594.
text.
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.

TransUnion L.L.C. v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2200 (2021).
Id. at 2221 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2225 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See generally id.
See generally id.
Id. at 2197.
Justice Thomas’s lengthy dissent develops these points. See supra notes 344–45 and accompanying
See generally Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004).
Id. at 249.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 259–66 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id.
See supra notes 436–60 and accompanying text (discussing the case).
See supra notes 436–60 and accompanying text (discussing the case).
W. Va. Univ. Hosp. Inc. v. Casey (West Virginia v. Casey), 499 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1991).
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Instead, the Court focused primarily on interstatutory language comparisons, detached from how such provisions or their absence fit in each particular compared
body of law.603 Aleinikoff and Shaw, in critiquing the West Virginia v. Casey
decision, argue for analysis akin to this Article’s call for assessment of consequential congruence.604 They say that statutory interpreters’ conclusions should
mesh with some plausible view of functions, goals, or purposes of the statutory
provisions at issue.605 They call this “the norm of due process of statutory interpretation.”606
Turning to the world of administrative agencies and law, a recent wave of
deregulatory actions similarly relied on focused legal parsing, federalism concerns, and avoidance of consequential congruence analysis. During the Trump
administration, agencies often said they had earlier engaged in illegal overreach.607 Such “statutory abnegation” claims neglected or lightly considered
whether the new resulting policies’ effects were congruent with protective goals
set forth in regulatory statutes.608 Such actions were overwhelmingly rejected
due to how they disregarded regulatory contingent facts, namely effects made
relevant under governing enabling acts.609 Few agency actions turn on mere language interpretation alone.610
Recall, however, that allegedly problematic consequences are sometimes
considered, potentially with decisive effect. For example, in UARG, Brown &
Williamson, and West Virginia v. EPA, and in other cases where the major questions doctrine is wielded, claims of huge political and economic consequences
can be decisive.611 Substantive canons of statutory interpretation are now increasingly wielded to further judicial policy views and often undercut statutes’
ordinary semantic meaning.612 Their assessment of impacts, however, is nothing
like the context-rich consequential congruence called for by this Article. In

603. Id. at 98–99.
604. See generally Aleinikoff & Shaw, supra note 436.
605. Id.
606. Id.
607. William W. Buzbee, Agency Statutory Abnegation in the Deregulatory Playbook, 68 DUKE L.J. 1509,
1511 (2019).
608. Id. at 1513.
609. Buzbee, supra note 254, at 1360–63, 1396–1401 (exploring how regulatory contingent facts and data
constrain regulatory policy).
610. See Buzbee, supra note 607, at 1568–70, 1588–91 (exploring effects analysis link to consistency doctrine obligation that agencies offer “good reasons”); see generally Stack, supra note 507 (explaining agency
obligation to act in furtherance of statutory goals).
611. See supra notes 471, 541 and accompanying text.
612. Of especial note, in West Virginia v. EPA, the operative language was conceded to give EPA a “plausible textual basis” for its action, but Court called the key term “best system” a “vague statutory grant” and “an
empty vessel” in a “little used backwater” provision insufficient to support EPA’s approach in the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan. 142 S. Ct. at 2609, 2613–14 (citations omitted). See generally Krishnakumar,
supra note 455 (analyzing policy purposes shaping ostensibly textualist Supreme Court opinions); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825 (2017) (critiquing Roberts Court’s use of
substantive canons); MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 249, at 395–410 (presenting scholarship regarding
power of substantive canons).
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particular, the major questions doctrine has become one-sided, with analysis of
consequences heavily weighted to favor those opposed to regulation.613
For example, in West Virginia v. EPA, despite the lack of a record basis for
claims of huge impacts, and even with regulatory goals already exceeded without
the challenged regulation ever coming into effect, the Court repeatedly framed
the case as about a regulation with huge, disruptive, transformative consequences
and extraordinary claims of agency power.614 These undocumented and actually
contradicted huge consequence claims drove the Court’s rejection of agency application of the key statutory term. The Court left utterly off the consequences
ledger the protective rationales called for by the Clean Air Act or the agency’s
empirically grounded analysis of business practices and benefits anticipated from
the action.
Microtextual statutory interpretation focused on dictionaries and a sampling of cases to support claims of overreach, as in Rapanos, are likewise imbalanced; such methodology neglects effects analysis rooted in statutory criteria by
the agency assigned work by Congress.615 In contrast, the consequential congruence analysis suggested by this Article would prioritize policy choices of Congress and give heavy weight to empirical assessments by agencies of risks and
regulatory effects if the agencies respect congressionally set power allocations,
procedures, and criteria.616
C.

Examples and Analogues for Consequential Congruence Analysis

This Article’s call for an omnipresent norm that legal actors assess consequences of their own choices for legal congruence, with careful attention to preceding and governing legal materials, ends up much like administrative law policy change or “consistency” doctrine.617 Most laws leave room for agencies to
make multiple permissible policy choices, especially in light of changing social
conditions, science, and policy experience. Courts nonetheless look for procedural regularity, adequate reasoning, and hewing to statutory requirements and
goals.618 Agencies must engage with their own previous related actions, past reasoning, criticisms, and assess on-the-ground changes, effects, and reliance interests.619 Agencies must justify their actions with “good reasons.”620 Any agency
policy must further the underlying mandates and purposes of governing
613. Monast, supra note 533, at 469.
614. West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. at 2608–16 (discussing the regulation in such terms).
615. See Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 387, at 2–17.
616. See infra Section V.C.
617. For analysis of this body of law, see generally Buzbee, supra note 254.
618. See generally Encino Motorcars LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016); FCC v. Fox Television
Stations (Fox), Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009); Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983).
619. See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (DHS v. Regents), 140 S. Ct. 1891,
1916 (2020) (rejecting Trump administration’s change of immigration policy forbearance due to lack of reasoned
explanation). For cases establishing agency burdens when making a policy change, see Encino, 136 S. Ct. at
2125–26; Fox, 556 U.S. at 515; Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 57.
620. Encino, 136 S. Ct. at 2126; Fox, 556 U.S. at 515.
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legislation.621 As Justice Kennedy noted in Encino Motorcars, these agency obligations are variants on agency “hard look review” and “reasoned decision-making” obligations under precedents like State Farm.622 These analytical obligations create a modest resistance against change, but check disruptive or
unreasoned shifts.623 A shoddily or pretextually explained action can be rejected,
as concluded in the Supreme Court’s census citizenship question case.624
The consequential congruence analysis suggested here also has analogues
in past statutory interpretation and jurisprudential and constitutional scholarship
that calls for legal actions to have integrity, show fidelity, or be reasonably congruent with the legal fabric. Like Felix Cohen, this Article finds claims that law
speaks in immutable ways with utter clarity as “transcendental nonsense.”625 The
doing of law is rarely just a language game. Legal language works to achieve
something, and stakeholders wield law in light of their goals; legal analysis rarely
can turn on words alone.626 Tom Merrill similarly calls for a “pluralist” statutory
interpretation method that gives primacy to legislative choices and deals with
interpretive puzzles with “integrative” and “welfarist” analysis attentive to
“faithful agent” obligations.627 This call for attention to consequences of tenable
choices with weight given to the political branches’ choices also shares attributes
with Hart and Sacks and the “legal process” school.628 Legal actions, especially
statutes, involve language that is a purposive utterance.629 Laws tend to state their
goals and set particular means and criteria for action in operative provisions.
621. For argument agency purposivism in interpreting statutes is both required and appropriate, see Stack,
supra note 507, at 871.
622. Encino, 136 S. Ct. at 2125–26. Agencies avoiding issues in contention run afoul of the “reasoned
decisionmaking” required under “hard look review,” a generally more rigorous form of “arbitrary and capricious”
review. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 575–89 (1985) (exploring the implications of rigorous review of agency actions); see generally Buzbee, supra note 254.
623. Fox, 556 U.S. at 515 (emphasizing multiple choices can be legal and recognizing political influence
on agencies).
624. See generally Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) (rejecting addition of a citizenship
status question to the census due to “incongruen[ce]” and a “disconnect” between the action taken and “contrived
reasons”); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (DHS v. Regents), 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1916
(2020) (in rejecting immigration policy shift, emphasizing lack of adequate justification tested through the regulatory process); see generally Benjamin Eidelson, Reasoned Explanation and Political Accountability in the Roberts Court, 130 YALE L.J. 1748 (2021) (analyzing these cases).
625. Cohen, supra note 16, at 812.
626. The debate between Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh in Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731
(2020) reveals such a textualist divide. Gorsuch focuses on how Title VII’s “because of sex” antidiscrimination
mandate in application fits to prohibit employment discrimination due to sexual preference and gender identity,
id. at 1737–54, especially at 1741, although also calling the law “plain and settled” and making extensive use of
dictionaries. Kavanaugh, in his dissent, claims the key words’ “ordinary meaning” could not reach plaintiff’s
claims, mostly sidestepping the words’ operational application. Id. at 1822–37 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). See
Eskridge & Nourse, supra note 419, at 1768–76 (criticizing both opinions).
627. See generally Merrill, supra note 498.
628. HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1378 (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (arguing
statutory interpreters should assume legislators were “reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably”); see also Fallon, supra note 6, at 1250–51, 1280 (introducing Hart and Sacks views and also comparing
“reasonable persons” formulation with others’ views).
629. HART & SACKS, supra note 628, at 1375.
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Legal actors should ensure that they, or actions they are assessing, further consequences evident in preceding or governing law, even if just incrementally
“chipping” away at a social challenge.630
Lon Fuller, in particular, framed his jurisprudential perspective much as
suggested here. He rejected a “pointer” view of law as too narrow; he called for
“fidelity to law.”631 He argued that “decisions about what ought to be done are
improved by reflection, by an exchange of views with others sharing the same
problems, and by imagining various situations that might be presented” and considering “the function performed by” legal materials.632 Lessig’s exploration of
“translation” and “fidelity” to “meaning” and “role” has a somewhat different
focus on major constitutional debates and the judicial role, but similarly describes approaches that balance respect for others’ roles and choices with movement in the law.633
Defenders of law as a pragmatism-based discipline, especially in the riskregulation setting, also suggest ways to reconcile a law-based regime with the
reality of change and constrained choice.634 Taking past legal actions as constraining starting points allows the reconciling of law with change and strategic
efforts to move the law.635 Under these views of pragmatism, law moves incrementally, subject to many constraints, yet with purpose and justification due to
the actions of many legal actors.636 All is not “up for grabs” all the time.637
This call for consequential congruence analysis also shares elements with
the general legal respect for precedent, under which legal actors are expected to
consider the accumulated wisdom of lines of legal authority developed by many
over the years.638 Even if a legal actor is not bound by hierarchical constraint,
respect for precedents usually means new choices must be explained and justified
with reference to such preceding authority.639 And although methods of interpretation and argument, including textualism, are themselves only lightly constrained by precedent, greater consistency in method by legal actors and institutions would enhance views that they are acting with fidelity or integrity.640

630. See generally Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (upholding challenge and plaintiffs’ standing despite resulting action being “incremental” and “chipping away” at a problem).
631. See Fuller, supra note 61, at 668–69.
632. Fuller, supra note 61, at 668.
633. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY AND CONSTRAINT (2019).
634. For an introduction to pragmatism in risk regulation, see generally ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & SIDNEY
SHAPIRO, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2003) (defending pragmatism and
criticizing cost-benefit analysis as a decision criterion in risk regulation).
635. For discussion of Judge Richard Posner’s pragmatism views, compared to those of Professor Fallon
and originalists and textualists, see Fallon, supra note 6, at 1242 and text accompanying note 48.
636. See GLICKSMAN & SHAPIRO, supra note 634, at 24.
637. Merrill, supra note 498, at 1599 (rejecting pragmatism if not constrained by legislative choices and
earlier law).
638. Cf. Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (2010)
(discussing stare decisis principles at Office of Legal Counsel).
639. See generally Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
640. See Gluck, supra note 234, at 81, 85 (arguing textualist methodology is not “really, as any kind of
law,” and not formalist due to “too many available rules”).
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Actions that leapfrog over inconvenient facts or contrary precedents fail to hew
to law’s norms of engaging previous and contrary linked materials.
Legal actions that claim obedience to legal command, yet fail to engage
with broader context and consequences, paradoxically undercut goals of prospective constraint.641 Explanatory gaps, as in the SWANCC case, create law that is
indeterminate and malleable.642 However, legal actions that engage with preceding authority and address consequences, like improvisors who build a solo with
logic and thematic clarity, are both more understandable and prospectively constraining.643 Successful work in both music and law requires persuasive reasoning through overt illumination of choice consequences, thereby drawing others
in, whether viewed as fellow players or “audiences”—listeners, other players,
judges, agencies, those affected by a regulatory action, and the next actors working with that material.644
An expectation that legal actors comparatively assess consequences of their
own choices is, concededly, imposing substantial work. After all, law tends to
involve consequences at several increasingly “meta” levels: the particular onthe-ground impacts of choices in light of underlying facts or science; implications of methods choices; resulting changes in how the law will work; respect for
institutions’ roles, expertise and primacy; and precedential implications of the
choices.645 However, strategic choosing of legal artillery by legal disputants usually involves knowing choices and vetting of others’ claims; neither agencies nor
judges are alone in figuring out choice consequences, nor are other legal actors.646 Adrian Vermeule’s “institutional analysis” frame soundly emphasizes the
limits of judicial competence, but perhaps gives inadequate attention to why lawyers and stakeholders will tend to gather and present materials illuminating consequential congruence, especially in the statutory and regulatory realms.647
Heightened attention to context and consequences, with the focus on politically accountable policymakers’ choices and priorities, is apparent in several
recent decisions that use a text-dominant mode of analysis, often with overt attention to how a statute functions. King v. Burwell, for example, looked closely
at the statute’s purpose provisions, its findings, and its operative structures to
reject the statutory challengers’ claim.648 The Court declined to adopt a reading
that would lead to a collapse of the very health insurance markets the statute was

641. See Stack, supra note 26, 1291–92 (analyzing functions of preambles).
642. See supra notes 375–85 and accompanying text (discussing SWANCC).
643. See supra notes 89–92, 169–72 and accompanying text (discussing improviser use of motifs and logical construction).
644. See generally Louk, supra note 10 (analyzing statutory audiences in addition to courts).
645. Id.
646. See generally BUZBEE, supra note 255 (reviewing materials wielded in regulatory wars).
647. VERMEULE, supra note 240, at 75–85, 153–82 (analyzing judicial competence and method choices).
648. See generally King. v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect
Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in an Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62 (2015)
(discussing functional text-focused analysis of King majority).
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meant to create and protect.649 It called for a “fair” reading of the statute.650 The
dissenters, in contrast, said such consequences should not be considered; language (in their view) demanded a very different outcome.651 The recent Bostock
majority opinion considered how Title VII’s “because of sex” prohibition in its
application logic unavoidably prohibited discrimination against individuals due
to their preference for a particular gender.652
Similarly, in the federalism preemption realm, decisions like Wyeth v. Levine and Gonzales v. Oregon did not just leap to some judicially preferred federalism balance.653 Instead, each closely examined the implicated bodies of law,
how they work, which actors were assigned what roles, the relative competence
of those actors, and incentives that the Court’s choices options would create.654
With more consistent attention to consequential congruence, opportunities
for contextless and abrupt politicized regulatory shifts would be lessened since
preceding law and the political branches’ judgments would be given weight.655
Such analysis would not eliminate the need, in the words of Professor Fallon, for
“the exercise of legally constrained normative judgments.”656 But mastery and
lucid engaged reasoning, in law and in jazz, are far more likely to persuade, be
constrained, and show integrity than are erratic or blindered actions insensitive
to the contributions and roles of others.
VI. CONCLUSION
To understand the law and nature of legal work, one cannot focus only on
the outcome of a moment in the law, or examine a word in isolation, or neglect
the many actors and institutions often contesting and shaping the law. Advocates
and legal actors operate in a shared web of institutions and constraints that
change over time. Law is not about mere interpretation, nor is it just a matter of
principled reading. It is not akin to playing classical, written music, even with
ever-present conceded space for interpretive shaping. There is no single law creator, nor does any legal actor actually have an enduring final say on the law.
Instead, as shown here, the shared, sequential, and strategic nature of law
is much like bebop jazz improvisation. Like jazz improvisation, where musicians
and music shape each other’s permissible choices, legal actors similarly act in
settings pervaded by choice and constraints. To be persuasive and sound, both
musical and legal choices must attend to constraining or governing materials,

649. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2493–94 (rejecting as “implausible” read that would cause “death spiral” of insurance market).
650. Id. at 2496 (“[a] fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the legislative plan”).
651. Id. at 2496–2507 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
652. See supra note 476–78 and accompanying text.
653. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201–03 (2009).
654. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 254–75; Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201–03.
655. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:
An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227 (1986) (exploring how respecting stated goals of statutes
rather than possible bargains would shift law in public-benefiting directions).
656. See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1306.

BUZBEE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

174

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

11/28/22 5:02 PM

[Vol. 2023

attentive to contexts and practices created by others both over time and proximate
to the moment of choice. In both musical and legal settings, the intellectually
challenging tasks rarely lend themselves to binary yes/no choices, or a single
predictable outcome. Error will often be clear, but choices will often call for
comparative critical assessment. The more the actors—whether lawyers or musicians—can weave their musical or legal tale with faithful attention to the many
sources of influence and constraint, the better that actor’s choices will be. A great
bebop jazz improvisation may be among the apex achievements of human accomplishment, and legal work less frequently a source of joy. Still, law and jazz
improvisation share structural and modal similarities and shed light on each
other. The practices of jazz improvisation illuminate how, in music and law,
powerful constraining materials come in many forms, often leave room for
choice and even creativity, yet the constraining materials also provide criteria for
assessing integrity and congruence.

